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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I investigate preferences for solar energy and solar siting
decisions in the states of Rhode Island (RI) and Massachusetts (MA). There is broad
support for solar energy in the United States, but the construction of utility-scale (1
megawatt capacity and above) installations has become controversial in recent years
because of the potential local land use externalities that can result. Despite the vast
literature on the impacts of various energy-producing infrastructures on areas in their
vicinity, surprisingly little research exists on the externalities associated with utilityscale solar arrays within the United States. Estimating the value that people place on
solar development will be valuable for informing policy.
In Manuscript 1, I quantify the externalities from nearby solar arrays in MA
and RI using the hedonic method and a difference-in-differences, repeat sales
identification strategy. I find that property prices for homes lying within 0.6 miles of a
solar installation decline between 1.5% and 3.6% post array construction. Results also
suggest that this effect is driven by solar developments on farm and forested lands and
in rural areas, which is intuitive given the composite impact of loss of open space and
loss of rural character. For these states, local disamenities are of the same order of
magnitude as the global benefits of abated carbon emissions, which helps explain local
opposition to siting.
In Manuscript 2, I complement the revealed preference hedonic analysis of
Manuscript 1 with a stated preference analysis to provide further insight into the
preferences for the following solar siting attributes: size of installation, visibility,
setback distance, probability of future residential development, and current land use.
Using data gathered from a survey of 656 respondents in RI, I find that land use is the
primary determinant of public approval of solar development. Respondents are
willing to pay an additional $10 to $21 in monthly electricity bills for solar
development on commercial and brownfield sites, and between $13 and $49 to
avoid developments on farm and forested land. Additionally, they prefer
installations that are completely hidden from view and are willing to pay between
$6 and $8 per month for a solar array to be fully hidden behind a vegetative
screen.

In the third and final manuscript, I examine the differences in preferences and
willingness to pay (WTP) magnitudes for solar siting attributes in RI between a
random sample of the population and a convenience sample of engaged stakeholders.
Engaged respondents are recruited from a list of individuals who had registered for a
webinar titled “Valuing Siting Options for Solar Energy in RI” that was organized by
the University of Rhode Island and advertised on social media in August 2021. The
random survey sample used for analysis in Manuscript 2 is comprised of 656
respondents. I find that the preferences of both the engaged and random sample
respondents are similar for most attributes. However, there are large differences in
WTP magnitudes, with engaged respondents exhibiting WTP values that are two to
four times higher than those of the random sample respondents. Although the overall
preferences can be said to be representative of the population at large, caution should
be exercised when generalizing valuation estimates derived from convenience
samples.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is written in three-manuscript form. The first manuscript is coauthored with Corey Lang and is under review by the Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management. The second manuscript is co-authored with Corey Lang,
Gregory Howard, and Ruth Quainoo. It is being reviewed by the Resource and Energy
Economics journal. The third manuscript is also co-authored with Corey Lang,
Gregory Howard, and Ruth Quainoo. It is being prepared for submission to the
Applied Economics Letters journal.
Manuscript 1: House of the Rising Sun: The Effect of Utility-scale Solar Arrays on
Housing Prices
Manuscript 2: When Energy Issues are Land Use Issues: Estimating Preferences for
Utility-Scale Solar Energy Siting

Manuscript 3: Are the Loudest Voices in the Room Different? Comparing Engaged
Versus Random Samples in a Contingent Valuation Framework
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Manuscript – 1
Submitted to the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, August 2020
House of the Rising Sun:
The Effect of Utility-scale Solar Arrays on Housing Prices
Vasundhara Gaur and Corey Lang
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode
Island

1

ABSTRACT
While utility-scale solar energy is important for reducing dependence on fossil fuels,
solar arrays use significant amounts of land (about 5 acres per MW of capacity) and
may create local land use disamenities. This paper seeks to quantify the externalities
from nearby solar arrays using the hedonic method. We study the states of
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which have high population densities and ambitious
renewable energy goals. Using difference-in-differences, repeat sales identification
strategies, results suggest that houses within 0.6 miles depreciate 1.5-3.6% following
construction of a solar array. However, additional analysis reveals that this average
effect is primarily driven by solar developments on farm and forest lands and in rural
areas, which is intuitive given the composite impact of solar, loss of open space, and
loss of rural character. For these states, the local disamenities are the same order of
magnitude as the global benefits of abated carbon emissions, which helps explain local
opposition to siting.
Keywords: Solar energy; Utility-scale solar; Hedonic valuation; Difference-indifferences
JEL codes: Q24; Q42; Q51
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1 INTRODUCTION
Solar energy in the United States has grown at an average rate of 49% per year
since 2009, making the US the second largest producer of solar energy in the world
(EIA International Energy Outlook 2019). In 2019, solar energy accounted for 40% of
all new capacity additions in the country, the largest ever in its history, and exceeding
all other energy sources (Perea et al., 2020). By June 2020, the cumulative installed
capacity of solar in the United States reached 81.4 gigawatts (GW), which is enough
to power 15.7 million homes (Perea et al., 2020). Solar is predicted to overtake wind
to become the largest source of renewable energy in the US by 2050, accounting for
46% of all energy produced from renewable sources (EIA Annual Energy Outlook
2018).
While there is a broad support for renewable energy in the United States (Bates
and Firestone, 2015; Farhar, 1994; Firestone et al., 2018; Hoen et al., 2019; Krohn and
Damborg, 1999), and for solar energy in particular (Carlisle et al., 2014, 2015; Farhar,
1994; Greenberg, 2009; Jacobe, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2019), the development
of large-scale solar installations has not been obstacle free. One major hurdle to
overcome before construction begins is the siting process. Solar installations require
over ten times more land area than non-renewable sources to generate the same
amount of energy, and the requirement of large tracts of land for their construction has
become the largest cause of land use change in the United States (Trainor et al. 2016;
Ong et al. 2013). Recently, the siting of large solar projects has become contentious in
some parts of the country due to concerns about visual disamenities, impacts on
ecosystems, building new transmission lines, loss of a town’s rural character, water
pollution, fire risk, water use, and reduction in property values (Farhar et al., 2010;
Gross, 2020; Lovich and Ennen, 2011). The debate is especially heated when solar
development is proposed on existing farm and forest lands, which is common because
these are the cheapest locations for development, but many consider antithetical to
environmental objectives (Kuffner, 2018; Naylor, 2019).
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the externalities associated with
proximity to utility-scale solar installations using hedonic valuation. Theory indicates
that property values will reflect people’s willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the
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cumulative disamenities of solar development (Bishop et al., 2019; Rosen, 1974). Our
objective is to provide policy relevant non-market cost estimates in order to help state
and municipal policy makers implement policies and decisions that reflect public
preferences.
We focus on the states of Massachusetts (MA) and Rhode Island (RI), which
are ideal for two reasons. First, both states have recently experienced a sudden boom
in the development of large-scale solar installations. This trend has been driven by the
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), regulations that require increased energy
production from renewable energy sources, which have been adopted by both states.
MA’s RPS calls for 25% of electricity generated by renewable sources by 2030 and
RI’s RPS calls for 38.5% by 2035. Second, both states have high population density,
ranked 2nd and 3rd among U.S. states. This level of development means that most solar
sites are proximate to residential areas, which yields many observed transactions for
precise estimates.
We analyze the impact of utility-scale solar installations sized 1 MW and
above on nearby property prices in MA and RI.1 We apply two empirical approaches.
First, we use a traditional repeat sales, difference-in-differences (DID) identification
strategy, which compares changes in housing prices after construction for nearby
properties with those further away. We empirically estimate the spatial extent of
treatment to be 0.6 miles from the solar installation and choose a cutoff for control
properties of two miles. Our primary sample consists of 282 solar installations, 11,292
housing transactions occurring within 0.6 miles (treated group), and 95,999
transactions between 0.6 and two miles (never-treated control group). However, pretreatment trends are not perfectly parallel and there exist differences in the housing
stock between treatment and control, which raise concerns about necessary
assumptions holding. Given these concerns, we also estimate a DID model using only
ever-treated properties, which relies entirely on temporal variation in construction
dates. This method is preferred if there are endogeneity concerns about the siting of
solar being correlated with trends in prices and not just levels. We present both models

1

Following the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), we define large-scale solar installations
as those with an installed capacity of 1 MW or larger.
4

for all specifications and hedge about which is preferred.
Across a variety of specifications, our results suggest that solar installations
negatively affect nearby property values. Results that average effects across all sites
find negative impacts ranging from -1.5% to -3.6%, with the models using only the
ever-treated sample consistently indicating larger effects. However, we examine
heterogeneity in treatment effects that lead to important insights. We posit that solar
arrays on farm and forest lands (“greenfields”) cause greater externalities, given the
combination of solar-specific disamenities and loss of open space amenities. Further,
rural areas may be more impacted by solar if industrial solar arrays are incongruent
with highly valued rural character, but on the other hand space is scarcer in non-rural
areas. We find that the average treatment effects are to a large part driven by greenfield
arrays and arrays in rural areas. Coefficients on non-greenfield sties and non-rural sites
are consistently negative, but never statistically significantly different than zero.
Our findings suggest that utility-scale solar arrays create local, negative
externalities. This helps explain local concerns and opposition to new development
and gives pause to current practices of not including proximate residents in siting
decisions or compensating them after siting has occurred. While a full benefit-cost
analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, we can compare the local, negative
externalities to the value of greenhouse gas reductions from the solar arrays, which is
the major global benefit. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations imply a benefit-cost
ratio ranging from 1.65 to 0.69 depending on the choice of model. While it is
promising that the benefit-cost ratio can be greater than one, it is clear regardless that a
substantial and uneven burden is imposed on local areas to achieve global benefits of a
similar magnitude. However, benefit-cost ratios are likely to be more favorable in
other states due to different sources of fossil fuels and sparser population.
The recent growth in utility-scale solar has been met with a wave of research
focused on assessing externalities and siting preferences. Prior hedonic valuation
research includes Abashidze (2019) who applies a DID methodology with treatment
and control defined by proximity, similar to our first model. Using data from North
Carolina, USA, she finds that property values decline 8.7% post-construction within 1
street-network mile of a solar array. She similarly tests for treatment effect
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heterogeneity by prior land use, but finds no statistical differences. Dröes and Koster
(2021) apply DID and rely on an ever-treated only sample, similar to our second
model. Working in the context of the Netherlands, they find a 2-3% decline in value
for properties within 1 km of a solar array. Jarvis (2021) uses data from the United
Kingdom and also applies a DID methodology, but uses properties near solar sites that
were proposed but not built as the control group. He finds zero statistical impact on
property values.2
In addition to the hedonic valuation studies, there are several stated preference
studies that also examine externalities from utility-scale solar siting. Botelho et al.
(2017) survey residents of Portugal using a contingent valuation approach and find
that respondents are willing to accept $12.93 – $56.64 per month on average as
compensation for being in the vicinity of large solar installations, which is on par with
our WTP estimates. In addition, Botelho et al. conduct a discrete choice experiment to
delve into aspects of siting that drive the disamenity and estimate that respondents are
willing to pay $8.65, $7.57, and $5.15 per month to avoid negative impacts on flora
and fauna, landscape, and glare effects, respectively. Kim et al. (2020) carry out a
choice experiment in South Korea focused on land use and find large WTP ($1,000$2,000 per household per month) for solar to be sited on rooftops and walls instead of
farmlands, orchards, and mountainous areas. Lang et al. (2021) develop a choice
experiment focused also on land use, but also attributes of arrays such as visibility and

2

Our work is additionally closely related to the extensive hedonic applications assessing externalities of
wind energy. Within the United States, studies that use data with large numbers of observations close to
turbines find no significant impact on property prices, including Hoen and Atkinson-Palombo (2016)
and Lang et al. (2014) using Massachusetts and Rhode Island data, respectively, and Hoen et al. (2015)
examining wind farms across the country. In contrast, studies in European countries find that wind
turbines have a significant negative impact on nearby properties, though the magnitude of the effect
differs by region (Dröes and Koster, 2016, 2021; Gibbons, 2015; Jarvis, 2021; Sunak & Madlener,
2016). Vyn (2018) finds the Canadian experience to be heterogeneous and dependent on community
acceptance. More recently, hedonic methods have focused on estimating externalities from offshore
wind turbines. While this literature is still in its infancy, early studies indicate no negative impacts to
property values or rental rates in the vicinity of offshore wind turbines (Jensen et al., 2018; Carr-Harris
and Lang, 2019). Hedonic valuation has also been applied to residential rooftop solar. General
consensus is that houses installed with rooftop photovoltaic panels sell for a premium, though there is
regional variation in the size of the effect: 3.5% in California (Dastrup et al., 2012; Hoen et al., 2012),
5.4% in Hawaii (Wee, 2016), 17% in Arizona (Qiu et al. 2017), and 3.2% in Western Australia (Ma et
al. 2016). However, this literature is only tangentially related as it is about quantifying internalities
(e.g., valuation of personal financial benefits, warm glow), not externalities, and has nothing to do with
land use.
6

property line setback. They survey residents of Rhode Island and find the largest
determinant of approval is prior land use with positive WTP for arrays on nongreenfield sites ($10 to $21 per month per household) and negative WTP for arrays on
greenfield sites (-$13 to -$49 per month per household). In addition, they find that
WTP increases with size of the array and that households are willing to pay $6-8 per
month to avoid full visibility. We contribute to this emergent literature by offering
another data point in the understanding of externalities and providing a test of
convergent validity for stated preference work.
Our work also relates to sociology and psychology research on renewable
energy acceptance. Patrick Devine-Wright, a leading scholar in this area, argues in
several articles against a simplistic NIMBY explanation, instead “local opposition is
conceived as a form of place-protective action, which arises when new developments
disrupt pre-existing emotional attachments and threaten place-related identity
processes” (Devine‐Wright, 2009). Our examination of heterogeneous treatment
effects by prior land use and population density are consistent with the ideas of
Devine-Wright and others (e.g., Brittan, 2001; Firestone et al., 2018; Wester-Herber,
2004) in that we are finding larger negatives associated with solar arrays developed in
areas where this technology contradicts ‘local character’ and substantially alters the
‘positive distinctiveness’ that people associate with such places.. We contribute to this
literature by adding a revealed preference, market-based metric of place meaning. The
combination of frameworks seems particularly important when thinking about optimal
siting of new infrastructure or prioritizing over multiple objectives in the energy
landscape.

2 DATA
To implement the hedonic analysis, we build a composite dataset that
integrates: 1) the data on the location and attributes of all solar developments in MA
and RI, and 2) the data on attributes and locations of residential properties in MA and
RI.
2.1 Solar data
7

The dataset on solar installations is obtained from the Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA’s) report EIA-860M, or the Monthly Update to the Annual
Electric Generator Report. The EIA-860M contains data on the total capacity of
electric generation facilities in the United States that have a capacity of 1 MW and
above, their point location (latitude and longitude), and the month and year that
operation begins. Figure 1 represents a map of 284 solar installations constructed prior
to August 2019, which is when we set the cutoff for being in our sample. The
installations are well dispersed across all regions in both states, which increases
confidence that estimates will not be affected by unobserved regional shocks. Figure 2
graphs new and cumulative solar capacity by year. The first installation began
operation in June 2010. New capacity displays a continuous upward trend through
2014. There is a sharp fall in 2015, after which the trend rises again and peaks in 2017,
before falling again in 2018. As of August 2019, the cumulative solar capacity of
utility-scale arrays in MA and RI is 817 MW. Capacity factors for this region are about
16.5% (EIA 2019), which means these solar installations are collectively producing
about 1180 GWh of electricity per year, which is enough to power 157,681 homes.
One limitation of our data is that we do not have shapefiles representing the
exact footprint of the solar installations, thus we must approximate that using
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software. Solar installations require
approximately 5 acres of land per MW of capacity (Denholm and Margolis, 2008; Ong
et al., 2013). We assume that the point location is the centroid of the installation and
then create a circle around it with an area equal to 5 times the capacity (in MW) of
each array.3
We hypothesize that prior land use may affect property value impacts.
Specifically, houses in proximity to farms and forests that are developed into solar
may depreciate more than houses in proximity to a brownfield or capped landfill that

3

We manually crosscheck the EIA data with Google Maps, and correct the latitude and longitude when
they do not correspond to the centroid of the array. We recognize that this approximation of distance
could lead some properties to be misclassified as treatment or control, inducing a small amount of
measurement error in treatment status. As a result, our DID estimates may be slightly attenuated.
8

is developed into solar.4 Since farms, forests, and other open space are amenities and
boost home values (Irwin, 2002; Lang, 2018), conversion of these types of lands may
lead to larger price decreases because it is the combination of a loss of amenities and
the gain of disamenities. To infer prior land use, we overlay the estimated circular
footprints on 2005 land use data obtained from Massachusetts Bureau of Geographic
Information and 2011 land use data obtained from Rhode Island Geographic
Information System for the respective states. We then assign each installation a prior
land use: ‘greenfield’ if it was formerly either a farm or forest land, and ‘nongreenfield’ if it was either a commercial site or a landfill.5 63% of installations and 70% of capacity
is classified as greenfield (see Figure A1 in the online appendix).

2.2 Property data
We use ZTRAX housing transaction data from Zillow
(http://www.zillow.com/data), which include information on property location
(latitude and longitude), sales price, date of transaction, and many property
characteristics (lot size, square feet of living area, number of bedrooms, number of
bathrooms, year built, number of fireplaces, central air-conditioning, and swimming
pool). The data include 2,095,835 property transactions from January 2005 to June
2019 in the states of RI and MA. Condominiums and houses with missing
observations for sales price, bedrooms, full bathrooms, and half bathrooms are
dropped. We also drop groups of properties with the same latitudes and longitudes, but

4

Solar developers prefer farm and forest lands because they have substantially lower construction costs
compared to alternative sites like brownfields, covered landfills, parking lot canopies, and industrial
areas.
5
Several solar installations cover an area with multiple land uses. We obtain exactly one land use type
per solar site in five additional steps. First, we classify the land use as ‘landfill’ if the installations have
the term ‘landfill’ in their name, or if they are listed in the EPA’s dataset of contaminated land. Second,
we use a stratifying logic to group all land-use types under seven major categories: commercial, farm,
forest, landfill, recreational, residential, and wetland. Third, we place ‘transportation’, ‘urban
public/institutional’, ‘industrial’, ‘powerline/utility’, and ‘junkyard’ under commercial; ‘orchard’,
‘cropland’, ‘pasture’, ‘nursery’, and ‘cranberry bog’ under farm; ‘spectator recreation’, and
‘participation recreation’ under recreation, ‘multi-family residential’, ‘low density residential’,
‘medium density residential’, ‘very low density residential’, and ‘high density residential’ under
residential; and ‘forested wetland’, ‘water’, and ‘non-forested wetland’ under wetland. Fourth, we rank
all land use categories under each installation by area, such that the land use with the greatest area gets
the highest rank. We drop all land use categories but the ones with the highest rank to obtain exactly
one land use per installation in the following four major categories: commercial, farm, forest, and
landfill.
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different addresses because this indicates incorrect geocoordinates. Sales prices are
adjusted to 2019 levels using the Northeast regional housing Consumer Price Index
from Bureau of Labor Statistics. After dropping transactions with prices of $100 or
less, since these are clearly not arms-length transactions, we drop transactions in the
bottom and top 5% of the sales price distribution to get rid of outliers. Further, we
drop observations that have more than four stories, six bedrooms, five full bathrooms,
or three half bathrooms. Houses that underwent major reconstruction are dropped
since they may have different attributes in previous transactions. We exclude homes
that sell before they were built, as there is evidence these are lot sales without
improved property. Properties that transact more than once on the same date are likely
to be subdivisions and are therefore excluded. We also drop single-family residential
properties with lot sizes larger than two acres, since large plots could be potential sites
for solar development and price impacts of nearby solar could be completely different.
Finally, we exclude all properties that transact only once in the chosen time frame
because we focus on repeat sales analyses. We spatially merge the solar data with the
property dataset by matching every property to the nearest eventual site of solar
development to infer proximity.
Similar to prior land use, we hypothesize that existing development in areas
surrounding solar arrays may impact property prices. Many rural areas pride
themselves on their rural character and residents seek out that type of bucolic setting.
Hence, construction of solar installations could be seen as an industrialization of the
landscape and may cause larger negative impacts on property values. Whereas solar
arrays in suburban and urban areas may be viewed as more congruent with existing
surroundings. However, space is also more constrained in suburban and urban, which
could lead to greater impacts there. We proxy for rural character with municipalitylevel population density, which comes from the 2010 Census. We define an indicator
variable 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙, which equals one if the town has a population density of 850 people
per square mile or fewer. We chose this cutoff because 850 is the average population
density of MA, which forms the bulk of the observations in our dataset, and, at this
cutoff, a little over a third of the properties and 66% of the solar installations are
classified as rural, which we believe are reasonable proportions. It is important to note
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non-rural properties should not be thought of as urban, but more suburban. Very few
utility-scale solar developments are built in urban areas as there is just not space.

3 METHODS
We use the difference-in-differences (DID) method in the hedonic framework
to analyze the causal impact of solar installations on housing prices. We begin with a
standard hedonic DID setup, in which we define treatment and control based on
proximity. Properties located near large-scale solar installations are compared to
similar properties that are further away from such installations, before and after
construction.
We estimate repeat sales models that use within-property variation to identify
the treatment effect by including property fixed effects:
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝜸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(1)

Where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the log sale price of house 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator for posttreatment, which equals 1 if a house sells after the treatment date, and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a house is located near an eventual solar site and 0
otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of temporal controls. 𝛼𝑖 controls for time-invariant
unobservables at the property level (e.g., school quality, proximity to other amenities
and disamenities, traffic volume, walkability, property layout, curb appeal, etc.).
Lastly, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. In our basic specification, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 includes month-year fixed
effects, which capture macroeconomic trends that affect the entire region that could be
correlated with solar development trends. In addition to this specification, we estimate
two more models. The first adds municipality-specific time trends to account for
different housing price trends between municipalities. The second includes countyyear fixed effects which allows for county-specific, nonparametric differences in
housing market trends. In all models, we cluster standard errors at the census tract
level to allow for correlated errors within a larger area. 𝛽1 is the change in prices for
control properties from before to after treatment. 𝛽2 , the coefficient of interest, is the
differential price change from before to after solar development for treated properties
relative to control properties.
There are two aspects of this DID setup that are initially uncertain: the spatial
11

extent of treatment, and the date on which treatment occurs. We define the treatment
distance to be equal to 0.6 miles and provide evidence to support this choice in Section
3.1. Similarly, we specify the treatment date to be 6 months prior to when the solar
array begins operating and provide supporting evidence in Section 3.2.
3.1 Spatial extent of treatment
Since the extent of treatment is unknown, we must identify d, the distance up
to which the effects of constructing a solar installation persist, and this will define the
boundary for our treatment group. Following similar strategies as Davis (2011),
Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), and Boslett et al. (2019), we estimate a DID model
similar to Equation (1), except with treatment defined in bins of successive tenth-mile
increments and control always being 2-3 miles. Figure 3 plots the estimates for each
tenth-mile distance bin ranging from zero to two miles. Results indicate large,
negative impacts for houses within 0.1 mile, but with large standard errors. Point
estimates are noisy, and some point estimates are close to zero. Bins 0.4-0.5 miles and
0.5-0.6 miles are negative and significant. Beyond 0.6 miles, all estimates are
statistically insignificant. Given this evidence, in all future specifications, we define
the treatment group to be within 0.6 miles and the control group to be 0.6 – 2 miles.6
We only include transactions occurring within two miles of any eventual solar
installation to increase similarities in observable and unobservable characteristics for
sample properties. For properties lying within 0.6 miles of two installations, we omit
those that transact before the closer of the two installations is built, but after the
further one is built. This removes only 0.04% of transactions and ensures a cleaner
identification of the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods in our model.

3.2. Timing of treatment
The date on which treatment occurs in the minds of home buyers and sellers is
ex ante unknown to us and is likely to pre-date the beginning of operation, which is

6

Figure A2 in the online appendix plots the estimates from a similar regression, except with control
defined as 1 – 2 miles. The results are qualitatively identical. Table A1 also examines robustness of
results using different control groups based on different distances, and results are similar to the main
findings.
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the only milestone for which we have an exact date. To identify the treatment date, we
conduct an event study that analyzes property price trends between the treated and
control groups over time. Specifically, we define a time variable in terms of 6 month
bins, starting from 6 years prior to operation date and up to 6 years post operation, and
we choose 6 – 12 months prior as the reference category. We then estimate a DID
model similar to Equation (1) in which we regress log sales prices on the treatment
variable, the time bins, and their interaction, along with month-year and property fixed
effects.
Figure 4 plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the event study
model. There are two takeaways from these results. First, we find a large drop in
prices in the 0-6 months prior bin relative to 6-18 months prior. The negative effect
starting 6 months prior is sustained, though noisy, for the remainder of the postoperation period. As a result, we choose to define the treatment date as 6 months prior
to operation date in all future specifications.7 This timing is in line with our
expectations because it takes time for the array to be constructed, and thus
disamenities will be apparent to potential buyers prior to operation. Second, while
noisy, there is evidence of a pre-treatment downward trend in prices, suggesting
properties near eventual solar sites may have been declining prior to construction. This
trend is punctuated by the large negative difference found in the 18-24 months prior to
operation time period, but is then reversed in the 6-18 months prior periods. One or
both could be anomalous, but the graph raises concerns about the viability of the
necessary parallel trends assumption.8 We discuss implications of this more in
Sections 3.3-3.4.
3.3 Summary statistics and assumptions

7

While we have presented versions of Figures 3 and 4 with the eventual spatial extent and treatment
and treatment date included, these findings are robust to different choices of one or the other.
8
Figure A3 in the online appendix presents a version of Figure 4 with time binned in increments of one
year. There is less noise, but the qualitative findings that treatment begins six months prior to operation
and relative prices are declining in treated areas pre-treatment hold.
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Our final, composite dataset includes 107,291 repeat-sales transactions
representing 45,795 unique properties around 282 solar installations. 9 We observe
11,292 transactions within 0.6 miles, of which 34% are post-treatment.
The summary statistics for key variables are given in Table 1. The first column
represents the mean and standard deviation values of our full sample. The mean sales
price is $314,710. The average property in our data has a lot size of 0.42 acres, has
living area of just under 3000 square feet, approximately 3 bedrooms, and is about 58
years old. About 46% of the properties are matched to a greenfield development, and
35% are rural.
The critical assumption for the DID design to yield causal estimates is the
parallel trends assumption, which requires that treatment and control properties would
have the same trend in outcomes if treatment did not occur. We first assess the
plausibility of this assumptions by comparing characteristics of treatment and control
properties, with the logic that similar properties are likely to have similar price
trajectories. The second and third columns in Table 1 compare pre-treatment housing
attribute means between the 0 – 0.6 miles (treated) and 0.6 – 2 miles (control)
observations. In the fourth column, we report the differences in means and their
standard errors, which are estimated by regressing each housing attribute on treatment
status in the pre-treatment period, along with month-year fixed effects. Several
variables have a statistically significant difference, which raises concerns over the
comparability of the control group. In the final column, we estimate differences in
means conditioning on census block fixed effects. In this case, none of the housing
attributes have a statistically significant difference in pre-treatment means, suggesting
that the addition of spatial controls mitigates covariate imbalance. Our regression
model uses property fixed effects, which effectively removes any concern about
covariate overlap, except if price trends are correlated with housing characteristics.
Second, we examine pre-treatment trends in sales prices as seen in Figure 4. As
discussed above, most coefficients hover near zero and are statistically insignificant in
the pre-treatment period. However, the coefficient for 18-24 months prior to operation

9

Our original dataset had 284 solar installations, but two are dropped because there are no repeat sales
properties within 2 miles of them.
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is negative, significant and large in magnitude. Additionally, there is some evidence of
an overall negative trend in the pre-treatment coefficients, though the coefficients 6-12
and 12-18 months prior run counter to that trend. Thus, the evidence is not convincing
either in support or refutation of the parallel trends assumption. Our identification
strategy detailed in Equation (1) will mitigate bias from unobserved, time-invariant
factors that are correlated with housing prices and solar siting. However, if the precise
location of a solar array is endogenous and correlated not just with time-invariant
unobserved attributes, but also correlated with price trends, then a comparison of
treatment to control areas may be biased. Therefore, in the following section, we
discuss an alternate DID estimator we employ that does not rely on a non-proximate
control group and thus removes bias stemming from site selection being correlated
with price trends.
3.4 Alternative DID estimator
We consider an alternative DID design that does not rely on a never-treated
control group. We estimate Equation (1) on a subsample that includes only treated
observations, and drops all properties that lie greater than 0.6 miles away from the
nearest eventual solar installation. Identification in this model relies entirely on
temporal variation in the construction of solar installations, instead of a combination
of this variation and variation in trends between near and far houses. One
inconsequential change is that the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is collinear with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
and drops out from the model. Our coefficient of interest is still 𝛽2 and has the same
interpretation. We only estimate these models including either municipality-specific
time trends or county-year fixed effects since there is no spatially proximate nevertreated control group to capture local time trends.
Figure 5 presents a pre-treatment price trends analysis for this alternative
estimator. Examining Figure 2, we essentially divide the sample in half based on
operation year, the thought being that properties near solar arrays built later can serve
as a control for properties near solar arrays built earlier. We exclude properties near
solar arrays built in 2010 and 2011 because this will allow more pre-treatment years to
be examined and we lose relatively few observations by doing so. We define treatment
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as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a house is proximate to a solar installation that
will be built in years 2012 – 2016 and equal to zero if proximate to a solar installation
that will be built in 2017 or later. Log sales prices are regressed on the interaction
between treatment and year dummy variables, along with month-year, property, and
county-year fixed effects. Estimated coefficients giving differences between treatment
and control properties over time and 95% confidence intervals are graphed. The price
trends look similar, with no evidence of any downward trend as in Figure 4.
DID methods excluding the never-treated group have been applied before in
many settings for myriad reasons. As mentioned in the introduction, Dröes and Koster
(2021) use this approach in their hedonic study of solar arrays and wind turbines in the
Netherlands out of concern for endogeneity of siting decisions. Beatty et al. (2021)
only include treated gas stations in their preferred model of price impacts of hurricanes
due to concerns about SUTVA violations. Lang and Cavanagh (2018) only include
treated properties in their hedonic study of brownfield remediation because the density
of brownfields made never-treated controls not proximate to treated observations and
housing characteristics were dissimilar.
In Section 4, for every specification, we present results using both the DID
model that includes the never-treated properties and the DID model that excludes the
never-treated properties.10 We remain equivocal about which is preferred and instead
focus on the range of estimates.
3.5 Heterogeneity in treatment effect
We extend the analysis to investigate heterogeneity in treatment effect in
multiple ways. First, we investigate heterogeneity in treatment effect by two placebased characteristics: prior land use and rural character. This is done by a triple
10

An additional concern with staggered DID models is that estimated coefficients can be biased if
treatment effects are heterogeneous over time and some observations have negative weights (de
Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020). We analyze our data for the presence of negative weights and
find relatively few. Applying the twowayfeweights command in Stata (de Chaisemartin et al., 2019),
12.6% of treated observations have an associated negative weight and the sum of negative weights is 0.0048. This compares favorably to the case study data used by de Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille
(2020) in which 40.1% of treated observations have an associated negative weight and the sum of
negative weight is -0.533. Further, the time corrected wald estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille (2020) produces estimates qualitatively identical to the standard DID. Thus, we are not
concerned about this particular source of bias.
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difference analysis in which we interact the treatment effect term in Equation (1) with
variables for our characteristic of interest. The specifications are as follow:
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 ) + 𝛽2 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 −
𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ) + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 )
+ 𝛽4 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 ) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝜸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(2)

𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 ) + 𝛽2 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 ) +
𝛽3 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 ) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝜸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
(3)
where 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a property is located within
the vicinity of a solar installation that was built on land that was formerly farmland or
forested and 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 = 1 − 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 . 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if property 𝑖 lies in a town with a population density of 850 people per
square mile or fewer, and 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 = 1 − 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 .
Our coefficients of interest in Equations (2) and (3) are 𝛽2 and 𝛽4 . In Equation
(2), we hypothesize that 𝛽4 < 𝛽2 < 0 because developments on farm and forest lands
will lead to larger negative impacts on housing prices due to the more dramatic change
in landscape compared to a commercial site or landfill and the loss of open space
amenities. In Equation (3), we again hypothesize that 𝛽4 < 𝛽2 < 0 because solar
arrays are less congruent with rural settings and the contrast will lead to greater price
declines, but there’s more uncertainty here because of land scarcity in non-rural areas.
Second, we estimate a model that allows for heterogeneity in the impact based
on distance. We identified treatment extending to 0.6 miles in Figure 3, but Figure 3
also suggests that treatment effects could be larger within 0.1 mile. To explore this
possibility more formally, we develop a model that defines multiple distance bands.
The first (outermost) band represents control properties located 1 – 2 miles away from
the nearest solar installation. The second band is properties 0.6 – 1 mile away, which
we differentiate from 1 – 2 miles to further test if the spatial extent of treatment does
end at 0.6 miles. The third band includes treated properties located 0.1 – 0.6 miles
from the nearest solar installation. Finally, the fourth (innermost) band consists of
treated properties within a distance of 0.1 mile from the closest installation. Our
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specification is:
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑4𝑘=2 𝛽2𝑘 (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕 𝜸 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(4)

where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a property 𝑖 lies within the 𝑘 𝑡ℎ distance
band. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , and 𝛼𝑖 are as defined in Equation (1). When estimating this
model excluding never-treated properties, we only get estimates on the two inner
rings, 0-0.1 miles and 0.1-0.6 miles.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Average treatment effects
We present our results estimating Equation (1) in Table 2. Columns 1 – 3
include the never-treated control group (distances of 0.6 – 2 miles), while Columns 4
and 5 exclude the never-treated properties. All columns include month-year fixed
effects and property fixed effects, Columns 2 and 4 additionally include municipalityyear time trends, and Columns 3 and 5 replace those with county-year fixed effects.
Including never-treated properties yields treatment effect coefficient estimates that
range from -0.015 to -0.024. Excluding the never-treated properties yields coefficients
that are about twice as large, ranging from -0.028 to -0.036. The smaller magnitudes
observed in Columns 1 – 3 likely stem from the pre-treatment, downward trend in
treated properties relative to never-treated properties seen in Figure 4. Overall,
treatment effects are negative and statistically significant across all models,
confirming our hypothesis that nearby solar installations are, on average, a disamenity.
Estimates suggest that houses lying within 0.6 miles of solar installations sell between
1.5% and 3.6% less post construction, all else equal.
We convert the percentage reduction to dollars by multiplying the coefficient
and the average, pre-treatment property price for treated properties ($314,710), which
gives us a range of $4,721 - $11,330. Assuming capitalization can be converted to a
welfare measure in this context (see Kuminoff and Pope, 2014), we can then translate
this price discount into an annual willingness to pay for avoiding proximity to solar.
Assuming a 5% interest rate, average annual willingness to pay is $236 - $567 per
household.
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4.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects
In Table 3, we examine the heterogeneity in treatment effect by three
characteristics: prior land use, rural character of towns, and proximity to solar
installations. Each panel presents two specifications, mirroring the sample and control
variables in Columns 3 and 5 of Table 2.
In Panel A, we provide estimates from the model described by Equation (2)
where we explore heterogeneity by prior land use. The results conform to our
expectations; estimated treatment effects for greenfield and non-greenfield sites are
both negative, but the treatment effects for greenfield sites is larger in magnitude. The
coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ranges from -0.020 to -0.044 and is
significant at the 5% level or higher in both specifications. In contrast, the coefficient
on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ranges from -0.011 to -0.013 and is not
statistically significant in either column.
There are two questions that arise from these results. First, do non-greenfield
sites have zero externalities? Statistically, yes, we fail to reject a null hypothesis of no
effect. However, the coefficients are consistently negative (also holds in Table 4
discussed below), so there may be some signal there, just not enough to overcome the
noise. Additionally, across non-greenfield sites, there could be additional
heterogeneity that we are unable to measure. For example, different arrays could have
varying degrees of visibility. To improve our understanding, we can draw on Lang et
al. (2021), who recently conducted a choice experiment survey on preferences for
solar siting attributes in Rhode Island. They estimate separate models for greenfield
and non-greenfield solar sites and find that respondents have positive WTP to avoid
fully visible arrays for both types ($10.34/month for greenfields and $4.42/month for
non-greenfields).11 In addition, respondents prefer further setback from property
boundaries for non-greenfield sites, but are indifferent about setback on greenfield
sites. Thus, these choice experiment results indicate that negative externalities can be

This is not to be confused with Lang et al. (2021)’s finding of a positive total WTP value for siting
arrays on non-greenfield land types. This result is not related to site proximity and instead reflects
overall preferences for siting solar arrays on non-greenfield land types.
11

19

present at non-greenfield sites. We argue that our hedonic estimates reflect those
negative externalities, though we cannot be confident in the exact magnitude of those
effects.
The second question raised by the results of Panel A Table 3 is whether the
difference of the greenfield treatment effect relative to the non-greenfield treatment
effect is driven entirely by loss of open space. This is a critical question because if the
alternative to solar arrays is residential housing and that leads to the same
disamenities, then there is no reason to be concerned about solar developments. In
truth, we cannot definitively know, but we argue there are attributes of a solar array
that lead to additional negative externalities beyond residential development of open
space. Some portion of the wedge could be due to nearby residents feeling that solar
arrays are incongruent with that type of landscape and it takes away from the aesthetic
of that place in ways that common houses do not. Additionally, we can again point to
the Lang et al. (2021) results that show greater negative viewshed externalities on
greenfield sites relative to non-greenfield sites, and these are on top of already
substantial WTP to avoid development on greenfield sties to begin with. Relatedly, an
unintended byproduct of this analysis is providing an upper bound on the value of
privately held open space. Irwin (2002) and Geoghegan et al. (2006) both examine the
property value impacts of developable open space (as well as permanently conserved
open space), but they use a cross sectional approach, and their estimates vary
substantially across models with some indicating developable open space is valued
more than residential development and some the opposite. Our research offers better
identification and bounds the impacts of loss of nearby developable open space as a
small negative.
In Panel B, we examine heterogeneity by rural character of towns and report
the coefficients from the specification defined in Equation (3). Similarly, these results
conform to our expectations; estimated treatment effects for rural and non-rural sites
are both negative and the treatment effect for rural sites is on average larger in
magnitude. The coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 ranges from -0.025 to -0.058
and is significant at the 5% level or higher in both columns. In contrast, the coefficient
on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 ranges from -0.005 to -0.006 and is not
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statistically significant. The results suggest that nearby utility-scale solar causes
housing prices to decline more in rural areas than suburban or urban areas.12
There is, as expected, a strong positive correlation (0.41) between greenfield
and rural, which raises the question of whether large negative results observed in rural
areas are just a function of the higher proportion of greenfields found there or vice
versa. Table A3 in the online appendix estimates a quadruple interaction model to try
to parse the effects of greenfields and arrays in rural areas. It is clear that the smallest
impacts accrue to properties near non-rural, non-greenfield sites. However, other
orderings are inconsistent across columns, with each of three other categories yielding
the largest negative impact in at least one specification. These results suggest we
cannot attribute the results to greenfield sites or rural sites alone. In addition, these
results bolster our claim that greenfield treatment effects are not entirely due to loss of
open space. In sum, the results of Panels A and B indicate that valuation depends on
context; surrounding land uses and place meaning contribute to the magnitude of price
declines.
Lastly, in Panel C, we estimate the model described by Equation (4) that allows
for heterogeneity in the impact on prices based on distance. The coefficient for the 0.6
– 1 mile band is statistically insignificant in Column 1, which is consistent with our
assumption that treatment effects do not persist beyond 0.6 miles. The coefficients on
the 0.1 – 0.6 mile band are significant and similar magnitude to the main results. The
coefficients on the 0 – 0.1 mile band range between -0.038 to -0.042, which is between
1.5 to 2.4 times larger in magnitude than the 0.1 – 0.6 mile band, though insignificant.
These results are suggestive that property values for homes lying within 0.1 mile from
a solar installation may fall substantially, but our estimates are imprecise reflecting
few observations within that distance band.13
In the online appendix, we also present results that test for heterogeneity by
size of installation and time since construction (see Tables A4 and A5). We find that
there are no statistically significant differences between categories, and results suggest

12

We examine different population density cutoffs for the definition of Rural in Table A2 in the online
appendix. Results are consistent across different cutoffs.
13
There are 218 observations lying within 0.1 miles from a solar installation, of which 72 sell post
construction.
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that larger installations do not cause greater price declines and that treatment effects
do not dissipate with time.
4.3 Robustness checks
In Table 4 we present results from a series of robustness checks to ensure that
our results are consistent to alternative data constructions or samples. We present
results both for the average treatment effect models and models focused on greenfield
heterogeneity. We include the latter because it is a critical piece of the story. Further,
we present results for both the models that include the never-treated control properties
(Panels A and B) and exclude the never-treated properties (Panels C and D) do the
same, except using the ever-treated sample.
Columns 1 and 2 explore the assumption of the amount of land required per
MW of installed capacity. Instead of 5 acres in our main models, Column 1 assumes 4
acres, and Column 2 assumes 6 acres. By contracting and expanding the assumed size
of installations, the set of properties that are designated as treatment and control are
altered. The estimated coefficients in these columns are qualitatively identical to the
main and heterogeneity results, indicating that assumptions about the radius of arrays
is not impacting results.
In Column 3, we control for the presence of wind turbines by including an
indicator variable equal to 1 if a house lies within one mile of a built wind turbine.
One may be concerned that solar and wind are co-located and disamenities from one
may be captured in the estimated valuation of the other if not controlled for. The
treatment coefficient is nearly identical to the main results. In MA and RI, there is
little correlation in the siting of wind and solar energy, and solar is far more abundant
(see Figure A4 in the online appendix).
Our main sample includes transactions in years 2005-2019. One may be
concerned that this is too long of a time horizon and changes to the hedonic function
can occur over that time. To address this concern, Column 4 only includes transactions
occurring 2009-2019, and Column 5 only includes transactions that are within four
years before or after the treatment date of the solar installation they are matched to.
Both of these sample restrictions, particularly Column 5, greatly reduce our sample
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size in the repeat sales model because fewer properties transact multiple times in a
short window. The average treatment effect estimates are larger, and the greenfield
treatment effects are over twice as large.
In the online appendix, we check the robustness of our main results in three
more ways. First, in Table A6 we test for anticipation effects two years prior to solar
farm operation date and find no evidence of anticipation. Second, for the model that
includes the never-treated properties, we vary the spatial extent of the control group
(Table A1) and find that the treatment effect is robust to different control group
boundaries. Finally, in Table A7 we examine whether regional price trends may be
correlated with solar installation construction by including distance to city center by
year trends in all our specifications. Our coefficients remain robust, suggesting that
this is not a threat to identification.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper estimates the valuation of externalities associated with nearby
utility-scale solar installations using revealed preferences from the property market.
Using the DID empirical technique, we define treatment by distance to the nearest
solar installation and compare treated properties to those lying between 0.6 and 2
miles from the installation (never-treated group), or to properties that receive a solar
installation in their vicinity in the future. We observe 11,292 housing transactions
occurring within 0.6 miles (treated group), and 95,999 transactions between 0.6 and
two miles (never-treated control group) of 282 solar installations in MA and RI.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: there is a consistent negative
average effect of proximity to utility-scale solar array, the estimates derived using the
ever-treated sample are consistently larger than the ones that use the never-treated
control group, and arrays sited on greenfields an in rural areas cause larger negative
impacts and drive the overall negative and significant average effects. Average
treatment effects suggests that property values decline between 1.5% ($4,721) and
3.6% ($11,330) after the construction of a nearby solar installation, all else equal. This
translates to an annual willingness to pay between $236 and $567 per household to
avoid disamenities associated with proximity to the installations.
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While a full benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of utility-scale solar arrays is beyond
the scope of this paper, because we do not know anything about consumer and
producer surplus14, we can at least benchmark the negative, local externalities against
the global benefits of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. We therefore conduct the
following back-of-the-envelope calculations. While solar arrays typically have a
lifetime of 25-30 years, there is uncertainty about what would happen after that time.
Thus, we ignore those dynamic issues and only calculate costs and benefits for a single
year. On the cost side, we first consider the point estimate from our preferred
specifications, which translate to a loss between $236 and $567 per year per household
for treated homes close to solar installations. Our complete dataset (prior to any
sample cuts) consists of 72,538 unique properties located within 0.6 miles of all solar
installations in the dataset. Put together, we estimate an annual welfare loss between
$17.12 and 41.13 million due to proximate solar installations in MA and RI.
To quantify the GHG benefits from solar installations, we first calculate net
generation from solar installations. Assuming a capacity factor of 16.5%, the 817 MW
of installed solar capacity in MA and RI generates is 1,180,892 MWh (megawatt
hours) of electricity per year.15 Current non-renewable generation in MA and RI comes
almost entirely from natural gas. According to the EIA, 0.42 mt (metric tons) of CO 2
are emitted from each MWh of electricity that is generated from natural gas, implying
that a total of 495,975 mt of CO2 are abated annually from solar energy generation. In
addition, natural gas can leak in the distribution system, which releases methane, a
much more potent greenhouse gas. Based on Hausman and Muehlenbachs (2018) and
EIA, each MWh generated from natural gas is associated with 104.72 cf (cubic feet) of
methane leaked. Thus, one year of solar generation mitigates an estimated 123,663
mcf of leaked methane, which has equivalent warming potential of 48,538 mt of CO2.
The EPA estimates the current social cost of CO2 is $51.80 per metric ton, which
places the value of annual greenhouse gas mitigation to be $28.21 million (US EPA).

14

To be sure, significant amounts of money are part of the market transactions. A developer quoted us
that they offer landowners $15-20,000 per MW per year of installed capacity. It is unknown how much
is profit and whether some portion of that could be used to compensate proximate households.
15
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) = % 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 365 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 × 24 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 ×
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑊)
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Combining the estimates, the benefit-cost ratio is between 1.65 and 0.69. In
one scenario (using the DID estimates including the never-treated properties), the
global benefits outweigh the local costs. However, using the DID estimates that
exclude the never-treated properties, we come to the opposite conclusion. Regardless,
in both cases it is clear that the local costs are substantial, bolstering local concerns
about solar siting and clarifying the magnitude of costs borne by neighboring property
owners. However, the benefit-cost ratio may be substantially better in other states that
are less densely populated and more reliant on coal.
This research offers policy relevant findings. Communities in southern New
England and elsewhere in the United States are currently grappling with contentious
solar siting issues and will be for some time. These results quantify some of the
opposition to certain siting decisions and allow those voices to enter into a state or
local BCA. Further, our results suggest ways to reduce negative externalities that
could be activated by state and local governments. In the case of siting on brownfields
and covered landfills, developers may require additional subsidies to target those
areas. Though non-financial costs, such as faster zoning approval may compensate
them as well.
There are several directions of important future research. Similar hedonic
studies should be completed elsewhere in the United States to assess similarity of
valuation estimates and test our assertion that benefit-cost ratios will be more
favorable elsewhere. Though, as discussed above, Abashidze (2019) finds even larger
impacts than ours in North Carolina. In addition, examining valuation of smaller solar
arrays (100 kW – 500 kW) could yield new insights. In southern New England, farms
can install arrays of this size on marginal land and generate income that can help
sustain the farm in the face of rising land costs (EcoRI, 2020). The main policy
recommendation stemming from our analysis is to move solar development away from
greenfields and away from rural areas if the objective is to minimize externalities.
However, implementing such a strategy could have unintended consequences for
environmental justice because it is marginalized communities that live in urban areas
and nearby non-greenfield lands. Future research can better inform how the
construction of solar installations differentially impacts minorities and low income
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communities. Lastly, community solar is a popular idea that is understudied in the
context of siting. A contingent valuation survey could assess willingness to accept
proximate community solar if it was structured such that nearby residents benefited
financially.
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Map of utility-scale solar installations across Massachusetts and Rhode
Island
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Figure 3: Spatial extent of treatment

0 - 0.1

1.4 - 1.5
0.9 - 1
0.4 - 0.5
Distance from nearest solar installation (in miles)

1.9 - 2

Notes: The treatment variable is defined as a bin variable, with treated properties lying within 1/10 mile
distance bands up to 2 miles. Control properties are those lying 2 – 3 miles away from the nearest solar
installation. Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months
prior to solar installation operation date. The coefficients are obtained by estimating a DID model
similar to Equation 1 that regresses log sales price on 1/10 mile distance bands up to 2 miles, along with
month-year and property fixed effects. Resulting coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are graphed.
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Figure 4: Event study of prices before and after solar installation operation date

Year bins
Coefficient

95% CI

Notes: The treatment variable is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of
an eventual solar installation site. The time period variable is defined as a bin variable, starting from 6
years prior to solar installation operation date and up to 6 years post operation. Properties are sorted into
the respective 6 month bin in which they transact, and the reference time period is 0.5 to 1 year prior to
operation date. The coefficients are obtained by estimating a DID model similar to Equation 1 that
regresses log sales price on the interaction between the treatment and the time period variables, along
with month-year and property fixed effects. Resulting coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are
graphed.
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Figure 5: Pre-treatment price trends for DID model excluding never-treated properties
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Notes: Sample size is 10,452 and includes properties within 0.6 miles of an eventual solar site built
2012 or later. Treatment is defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a house is proximate to a solar
installation that will be built between 2012 and 2016 and equal to 0 if proximate to a solar installation
built in 2017 or later. Log sales prices are regressed on the interaction between treatment and year
dummy variables, along with month-year, property, and county-year fixed effects. Estimated
coefficients giving differences between treatment and control properties over time and 95% confidence
intervals are graphed.
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Table 1: Housing attribute means by treatment status
Pre-treatment means
Full
(std. dev.)
sample
Variable
means
0 - 0.6
0.6 - 2
(std. dev.)
miles
miles
Price (000's)
Lot size (acres)
House area (000's sq. feet)
Bedrooms
Full bathrooms
Half bathrooms
Age of home (years)
Pool (1 = yes)
Air conditioning (1 = yes)
Fireplace number
Greenfield (1 = yes)
Rural (1 = yes)
Observations

314.71
(159.73)
0.42
(0.37)
2.92
(1.22)
3.09
(0.71)
1.53
(0.62)
0.48
(0.52)
58.06
(35.71)
0.05
(0.21)
0.35
(0.48)
0.39
(0.58)
0.46
(0.50)
0.35
(0.48)
107,291

305.36
(158.08)
0.47
(0.40)
2.86
(1.26)
3.04
(0.70)
1.52
(0.62)
0.45
(0.52)
50.19
(33.26)
0.05
(0.22)
0.38
(0.49)
0.35
(0.56)
0.49
(0.50)
0.39
(0.49)
7,448

Difference
in means
(std. error)

316.37 -11.630
(160.45) (8.688)
0.41
0.057***
(0.37) (0.020)
2.92
-0.064
(1.22) (0.072)
3.09
-0.046**
(0.72) (0.019)
1.53
-0.010
(0.62) (0.024)
0.48
-0.032**
(0.52) (0.016)
56.08
-5.888***
(35.75) (1.526)
0.05
-0.002
(0.22) (0.008)
0.35
0.039**
(0.48) (0.020)
0.40
-0.047**
(0.58) (0.023)
0.47
0.024
(0.50) (0.036)
0.37
0.049
(0.48) (0.034)
64,322

Difference
in means
with spatial
controls
(std. error)
-1.907
(6.075)
0.008
(0.019)
0.045
(0.061)
-0.015
(0.019)
-0.016
(0.032)
-0.019
(0.025)
1.487
(1.785)
0.004
(0.011)
0.002
(0.022)
0.000
(0.026)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)

Notes: Sales prices are adjusted to 2019 levels using the CPI. In Column 4, the differences in means
and standard errors are estimated by regressing each housing attribute on treatment status and monthyear fixed effects, using only pre-treatment transactions. Column 5 adds census block fixed effects to
the regression model used in Column 4 and reports the estimated differences in means and standard
errors. Standard errors are clustered at the tract level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2: Estimates of the impact of solar installations on property prices
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
Independent variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post
0.017*** -0.003
-0.005
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Treated × Post
-0.024*** -0.018*** -0.015**
-0.036***
-0.028**
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Property fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Municipality time trends
Y
Y
County-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Observations
107,291
107,291
107,291
11,292
11,292
2
R
0.871
0.876
0.878
0.889
0.891
Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of an eventual solar installation site and Post = 1 if a house sells after
the treatment date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Standard errors
are clustered at the tract level and shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

Table 3: Heterogeneity of treatment effects
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
(1)
(2)

Independent variables
Panel A: Heterogeneity by prior land use
Treated × Post × Non-greenfield
Treated × Post × Greenfield
Panel B: Heterogeneity by population density
Treated × Post × Non-rural
Treated × Post × Rural
Panel C: Heterogeneity by proximity
(0.6 – 1 mile) × Post
(0.1 – 0.6 miles) × Post
(0 – 0.1 miles) × Post
Observations

-0.011
(0.010)
-0.020**
(0.009)

-0.013
(0.015)
-0.044***
(0.014)

-0.006
(0.009)
-0.025**
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.015)
-0.058***
(0.014)

-0.005
(0.006)
-0.016**
(0.007)
-0.038
(0.052)
107,291

-0.028**
(0.013)
-0.042
(0.053)
11,292

Notes: Both specifications include property, month-year, and county-year fixed effects. Treated = 1 if
a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction and Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment
date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Greenfield =
1 if the prior land use is farm or forest land and Non-greenfield = (1-Greenfield). Rural = 1 if the
population density per square mile is ≤ 850 and Non-rural = (1-Rural). In column 1, the Panel A
model also includes Post × Greenfield and the Panel B model includes Post × Rural, though neither
coefficient is displayed. In Panel C, (0.6 – 1 mile), (0.1 – 0.6 miles), and (0 – 0.1 mile) are dummy
variables = 1 if properties lie within the respective distances from the nearest eventual solar
installation, and distance bin for 1 – 2 miles is omitted in Column 1. Standard errors are clustered at
the tract level and shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Independent variables

Panel A: Standard model
Treated × Post
Panel B: Heterogeneity model
Treated × Post × Non-greenfield
Treated × Post × Greenfield

Panel C: Standard model
Treated × Post
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Panel D: Heterogeneity model
Treated × Post × Non-greenfield
Treated × Post × Greenfield

1 MW =
4 acres
(1)

1 MW =
6 acres
(2)

Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Control for
Drop pre-2009
wind turbines
transactions
(3)
(4)
Include never-treated
-0.015**
(0.007)

-0.025***
(0.009)

Keep properties transacting +/4 years from treatment date
(5)

-0.014*
(0.007)

-0.014**
(0.007)

-0.011
(0.010)
-0.017*
(0.009)

-0.009
(0.010)
-0.019**
(0.009)

-0.024*
(0.013)

-0.030**
(0.013)

-0.027**
(0.013)

-0.038**
(0.016)

-0.066**
(0.028)

-0.009
(0.016)
-0.038***
(0.014)

-0.015
(0.015)
-0.045***
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.015)
-0.044***
(0.014)

-0.010
(0.019)
-0.067***
(0.017)

-0.027
(0.031)
-0.111***
(0.032)

-0.011
-0.014
(0.010)
(0.013)
-0.020**
-0.037***
(0.009)
(0.012)
Exclude never-treated

-0.021*
(0.012)
-0.003
(0.016)
-0.043***
(0.016)

Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction, and Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment date. The treatment date is defined as
6 months prior to solar installation operation date. In Columns 1 and 2 we assume that the land area required for 1 MW of solar capacity is 4 acres and 6
acres, respectively. We control for the presence of wind turbines in Column 3 by including a dummy variable = 1 if a property lies within 1 mile of a postconstruction wind turbine. Column 4 drops all transactions occurring before 2009, and Column 5 excludes all properties that transact more than 4 years
before or after the treatment date of the nearest solar installation. All specifications include property, month-year, and county-year fixed effects. The number
of observations for the difference-in-differences models are: 106,552 in Column 1, 107,924 in Column 2, 107,291 in Column 3, 61,121 in Column 4, and
33,030 in Column 5. The number of observations for the Ever-treated models are: 10,965 in Column 1, 11,526 in Column 2, 11,292 in Column 3, 6,427 in
Column 4, and 3,506 in Column 5. Standard errors are clustered at the tract level and shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.

Appendix
This appendix provides supplemental equations, figures, and tables to our main
results.
Figure A1 depicts the increase in new and cumulative solar capacity over time by prior
land use.
Figure A2 recreates Figure 3 from our main manuscript, using the same DID
specification, but with control defined as 1 – 2 miles. Our conclusion is the same: that
the treatment effect does not persist beyond 0.6 miles.
Figure A3 presents a version of Figure 4 from the main manuscript, except with
treatment bins defined by 1 year intervals. Our conclusion is the same, treatment
begins six months prior to the solar installation operation date.
Figure A4 shows the location of utility-scale solar and wind installations in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
Figure A5 illustrates the distribution of capacity sizes (in MW) of solar arrays in our
data.
Table A1 checks how sensitive our main results are with respect to the definition of the
never-treated control group. Each column represents different spatial boundaries of the
control group. We find that the treatment effect is significant across the board and very
close in magnitude to our main result, implying that our results are robust to different
definitions of the control group.
Table A2 explores how different population density cutoff values that define the
variable 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 affect the results presented in Panel B of Table 3 in the main paper.
Panel A presents results using the sample that includes never-treated observations
while Panel B excludes them. 850 people/square mile is the cutoff used in the main
text. Overall, the results communicate the same story as the results presented in Table
3: negative impacts are more pronounced in rural areas. All coefficients on
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 are negative and statistically significant. All coefficients on
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 are negative, statistically insignificant, and smaller
in magnitude than their corresponding 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 coefficient.
Magnitudes of the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 coefficients decline as the population
density cutoff increases, which makes sense because more suburban areas are being
classified as rural and these areas have smaller impacts.
Table A3 further explores heterogeneity by prior land use and rural character. We
estimate a quadruple difference model that interacts the treatment effect term in
Equation 1 with the 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙, and 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙
indicator variables. The coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 −
𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, which represents the effect of non-greenfield solar arrays in non-rural

36

areas, is negative throughout, though the coefficients are typically small in magnitude
and are never significant. The coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 −
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 × 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, which applies to greenfield sites in non-rural areas, is negative
across the board but significant only in Columns 1 and 2 at the 5% and the 10% level,
respectively. The coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑,
which applies to non-greenfield sites in rural areas, is negative across all specifications
with a large magnitude everywhere except Column 4. It is also only significant (at the
10% level) in Column 3. Lastly, the coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 ×
𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, which applies to greenfield sites in rural areas, is statistically significant
across the board. This coefficient ranges between -2.1% and -2.5% in Columns 1 – 3,
and between -6.4% to -7.5% in Columns 4 and 5. The large coefficients in the sample
excluding the never-treated group are consistent with our main results. Overall, these
results suggest that the average results are driven by greenfield and rural
developments, but no clear picture emerges that one of these attributes is dominant.
Instead, there appears to be an additive effect.
Table A4 explores heterogeneity in treatment effect by the size of the solar
installations. We define 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 as an indicator variable = 1 if the size of the
installation (in MW) is less than or equal to the median value in our sample (2 MW)
and 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 as an indicator variable = 1 if the size of the installation is
greater than 2 MW. We find that the difference between the two categories is small and
is statistically insignificant, implying no additional disamenities from solar
developments larger than 2 MW. We additionally explore an alternative specification
(results not provided) where capacity is treated as a linear variable and is interacted
with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 . These estimates yield the same conclusion to those in Table
A3. This result indicates that the presence of utility-scale solar is a disamenity
regardless of size. Given that the smallest installations in our analysis are still quite
large at five acres in size (about 3.8 football fields), it could be that there is no
additional impact of size because it is difficult or even impossible to see beyond five
acres from ground level. However, one limitation of this analysis is that the range of
observed sizes is narrow. Of the 282 installations in our dataset, almost 47% have a
capacity of 2 MW or lesser, and only 23 (8%) are 5 MW or larger. See Figure A6 for a
full sense of the distribution of array sizes.
Table A5 examines heterogeneity in treatment effect by time elapsed since treatment.
We split our 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 variable into two sub-categories: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) and
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (3 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠), where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) is a dummy variable = 1
if a property transacts less than three years after the treatment date, and
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (3 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) is a dummy variable = 1 if a property transacts 3 or more
years after the treatment date. We interact both variables with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑, and find that
the coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (3 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) is almost similar in magnitude
to 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) but not always significant, and never are the
coefficients statistically significantly different from each other. These results suggest
that the treatment effect does not weaken with time.
Table A6 examines anticipation effects leading up to the actual construction of solar
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installations. We make an ad hoc assumption that the siting process for a solar
development can take up to two years. We account for anticipation effects by
including an additional term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 that interacts 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 with
the indicator variable 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 which is equal to 1 if a house sells 24 to 6 months
prior to solar installation operation date. We find that the coefficient on
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is small in magnitude and insignificant across all
specifications. Our original treatment effect term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 remains mostly
unaffected, implying the absence of any prior anticipation effects.
Table A7 checks the robustness of our main results to controlling for differences in
price trends between rural and more urban locations. We classify Boston, Providence,
Springfield, and Worcester as major cities and include an additional term which is an
interaction between distance to nearest city and a year trend in all specifications. This
new variable does show up as statistically significant in three of five specification, but
our treatment effect coefficients are quite similar to the main results, implying that our
results are robust to this type of trend in prices.
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Figure A2: Spatial extent of treatment effect

0 - 0.1

0.4 - 0.5
Distance from nearest solar installation (in miles)

0.9 - 1

Notes: The treatment variable is defined as a bin variable, with treated properties lying within 1/10 mile
distance bands up to 1 mile. Control properties are those lying 1 – 2 miles away from the nearest solar
installation. Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months
prior to solar installation operation date. The coefficients are obtained by estimating a DID model
similar to Equation 1 that regresses log sales price on 1/10 mile distance bands up to 1 mile, along with
month-year and property fixed effects. Resulting coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are graphed.
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Figure A3: Event study of prices before and after solar installation operation date
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Notes: The treatment variable is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of
an eventual solar installation site. The time period variable is defined as a bin variable, starting from 6
years prior to solar installation operation date and up to 6 years post operation. Properties are sorted into
the respective 1-year bin in which they transact, and the reference time period is 0.5 to 1.5 years prior to
operation date. The coefficients are obtained by estimating a DID model similar to Equation 1 that
regresses log sales price on the interaction between the treatment and the time period variables, along
with month-year and property fixed effects. Resulting coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are
graphed.
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Figure A4: Location of utility-scale solar and wind installations in MA and RI

Notes: Orange dots represent the location of solar installations and blue dots represent wind
installations. Data come from EIA.
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3.6 - 4

4.1 - 4.5

4.6 - 5 Greater than 5

Table A1: Difference-in-differences robustness checks with varying control
group bin definitions
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Independent
Control group distance bands
variables
0.6 - 1.5 miles 0.6 - 3 miles 1 - 2 miles 1 - 3 miles
-0.015**
-0.017**
-0.015**
-0.016**
Treated × Post
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Observations
67,836
183,566
86,438
162,713
R2
0.879
0.875
0.877
0.875
Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction, and Post = 1 if a house
sells after the treatment date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar
installation operation date. All models include month-year, county-year, and property fixed
effects. Standard errors, clustered at the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table A2 Heterogeneity of treatment effects by population density
Independent variables
Panel A: Include never-treated
Treated × Post × Non-rural
Treated × Post × Rural
Panel B: Exclude never-treated
Treated × Post × Non-rural
Treated × Post × Rural

500

Population density per square mile cutoff
850
1000
1200
1500
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-0.010
(0.008)
-0.031**
(0.016)

-0.006
(0.009)
-0.025**
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.009)
-0.025**
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.010)
-0.022**
(0.009)

-0.012
(0.012)
-0.016*
(0.008)

-0.013
(0.013)
-0.084***
(0.019)

-0.005
(0.015)
-0.058***
(0.014)

-0.008
(0.015)
-0.050***
(0.014)

-0.008
-0.008
(0.015)
(0.017)
-0.048*** -0.040***
(0.014)
(0.013)

2000
-0.010
(0.013)
-0.017**
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.018)
-0.038***
(0.013)

Notes: Dependent variable is log sale price and the number of observations is 107,291 in all specifications in Panel A and 11,292 in all
specifications in Panel B. Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment date.
The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Rural = 1 if the population density per square mile is ≤
column heading value and Non-rural = (1-Rural). All models include month-year, county-year, and property fixed effects. In Panel A, the
percentage of observations that qualify as rural for each cutoff value of density per square mile are: 16% for 500, 35% for 850, 39% for 1000,
43% for 1200, 54% for 1500, and 61% for 2000. For Panel B, these percentages are: 20% for 500, 40% for 850, 44% for 1000, 47% for 1200,
58% for 1500, and 65% for 2000. Standard errors, clustered at the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table A3: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by land use and population density
Independent variables
Treated × Post × Non-rural × Non-greenfield
Treated × Post × Non-rural × Greenfield
Treated × Post × Rural × Non-greenfield
Treated × Post × Rural × Greenfield

46

Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Property fixed effects
Municipality time trends
County-year fixed effects
Observations
R2

Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.012
-0.006
-0.005
-0.020
-0.003
(0.016)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.018)
(0.017)
-0.035**
-0.027*
-0.007
-0.033
-0.009
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.023)
(0.017)
-0.026
-0.026
-0.034*
-0.006
-0.041
(0.020)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.038)
(0.025)
-0.023*
-0.025**
-0.021*
-0.075***
-0.064***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.021)
(0.015)
Y
Y

107,291
0.871

Y
Y
Y
107,291
0.876

Y
Y
Y
107,291
0.878

Y
Y
Y
11,292
0.889

Y
Y
Y
11,292
0.891

Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 1 mile of a solar construction, and Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment date. The treatment date is
defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Columns 1 – 3 include the following additional interactions: Treated*Rural,
Treated*Greenfield, Post*Rural, Post*Greenfield, Rural*Greenfield, Post*Greenfield*Rural, and Treated*Rural*Greenfield. Standard errors,
clustered at the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table A4: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by solar installation size
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Independent variables
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Treated × Post × SmallCapacity
-0.018
-0.018** -0.017*
-0.035** -0.038***
(0.012)
(0.008) (0.010)
(0.016)
(0.014)
Treated × Post × LargeCapacity
-0.031*** -0.018* -0.013
-0.037** -0.018
(0.011)
(0.010) (0.010)
(0.016)
(0.015)
Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Property fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Municipality time trends
Y
Y
County-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Observations
107,291
107,291 107,291
11,292
11,292
R2
0.871
0.876
0.878
0.889
0.891
Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction, and Post = 1 if a house sells after the
treatment date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. SmallCapacity =
1 if the capacity of the installation is ≤ 2 MW and LargeCapacity = (1- SmallCapacity). Standard errors, clustered
at the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

48

Table A5: Heterogeneity of treatment effects by years since construction
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Independent variables
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Treated × Post (Less than 3 years) -0.027*** -0.020** -0.018**
-0.037*** -0.028**
(0.010)
(0.008) (0.009)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Treated × Post (3 or more years)
-0.010
-0.022* -0.016*
-0.042**
-0.021
(0.009)
(0.011) (0.010)
(0.021)
(0.017)
Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Property fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Municipality time trends
Y
Y
County-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Observations
107,291
107,291 107,291
11,292
11,292
R2
0.871
0.876
0.878
0.889
0.891
Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of a solar construction. Post (Less than 3 years) = 1 if a house sells
within 3 years post-treatment date, and Post (3 or more years) = 1 if a house sells 3 or more years after the treatment
date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Standard errors, clustered at
the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table A6: Estimates of the impact of solar installations on property prices including anticipation
effects
Independent variables
Treated × Anticipation
Treated × Post
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Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Property fixed effects
Municipality time trends
County-year fixed effects
Observations
2

R

Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.003
0.006
0.003
0.004
-0.005
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.017)
(0.014)
-0.024*** -0.017** -0.014**
-0.033*
-0.032*
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.018)
(0.017)
Y
Y

Y
Y

107,291

Y
107,291

0.871

0.876

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

107,291

Y
11,292

11,292

0.878

0.889

0.891

Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 0.6 miles of an eventual solar installation site, Post = 1 if a house sells after
the treatment date, and Anticipation = 1 if a house sells 6 to 24 months prior to treatment date. The treatment date is
defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Standard errors are clustered at the tract level and
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table A7: Estimates of the impact of solar installations on property prices accounting for distance
to city by year trends
Dependent variable: Sale price (ln)
Independent variables
Include never-treated
Exclude never-treated
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Treated × Post
-0.024*** -0.018***
-0.013**
-0.036***
-0.028**
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.0001**
-0.0002
-0.0004***
-0.0001
-0.0004***
Miles to city × year
(0.00004)
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0005)
(0.0001)
Controls
Month-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Property fixed effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Municipality time trends
Y
Y
County-year fixed effects
Y
Y
Observations
107,291
107,291
107,291
11,292
11,292
R2
0.871
0.876
0.878
0.889
0.891
Notes: Treated = 1 if a house is within 1 mile of a solar construction, and Post = 1 if a house sells after the treatment
date. The treatment date is defined as 6 months prior to solar installation operation date. Standard errors, clustered at
the tract level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Manuscript – 2
Submitted to Resource and Energy Economics, May 2021
When Energy Issues are Land Use Issues:
Estimating Preferences for Utility-Scale Solar Energy Siting
a

Vasundhara Gaur a, Corey Lang a, Gregory Howard b , and Ruth Quainoo b
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of
Rhode Island
b
Department of Economics, East Carolina University

51

ABSTRACT
Solar energy has grown rapidly in recent years and will continue to do so as states
and nations seek to curtail carbon emissions. While solar energy receives broad
support in general, the siting of utility-scale solar arrays is contentious because at
that stage it becomes a land use issue replete with potential disamenities and
difficult tradeoffs. We developed and conducted a choice experiment survey to
estimate preferences for various attributes of utility-scale solar arrays in Rhode
Island, USA, where ambitious renewable energy targets collide with scarce land
resources. Our results suggest the largest indicator of solar development approval
is prior land use, with residents willing to pay an additional $10-21 in monthly
utility bills for developments in commercial, industrial, brownfield, and covered
landfill areas, whereas they are willing to pay $13-49 to avoid developments on
farm and forest land. Additionally, respondents are willing to pay about $6 -8 per
month for a solar array to be fully screened and not visible. We conclude with a
discussion of how these preferences can be incorporated into state and local solar
siting policy.
Keywords: Solar energy; Utility-scale solar; Willingness to pay; Contingent valuation;
Choice experiment
JEL codes: Q24; Q42; Q51
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1 INTRODUCTION
Solar energy has grown immensely in the United States, with an average
annual growth rate of almost 42% since 2010 (M. Davis et al., 2021). In 2020, the
United States had over 89 gigawatts (GW) of total installed capacity, which is enough
to power 16.4 million homes and accounts for 2.6% of total electricity generation (M.
Davis et al., 2021). In the next few years, solar energy is projected to grow faster than
any other renewable source in the United States, more than doubling its total installed
capacity by 2025, and accounting for 47% of total renewable electricity generation by
2050 (EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2021).
Despite broad support for solar energy in the United States (Carlisle et al.,
2014, 2015; Farhar, 1994; Greenberg, 2009; Jacobe, 2013; Pew Research Center,
2019), the construction of utility-scale solar installations (sized 1 MW and above) is
often fraught with hurdles. The key insight as to why solar can be divisive is to
understand that siting of utility-scale solar is a land use issue as much as it is an energy
issue. Utility-scale solar installations require large amounts of land. The proliferation
of solar has become the largest cause of land use change in the United States (Trainor
et al., 2016). On average, a solar installation with a capacity of one megawatt (MW)
requires five acres of land, which is over ten times the land area required by
conventional sources (Denholm and Margolis, 2008; Ong et al., 2013) and is often the
greatest obstacle to additional solar development. Other concerns of residents related
to solar development include glare from glass panels, ecosystem impacts, loss of
scenic beauty and rural character, water pollution, and reduction in property values
(Abashidze, 2019; Dröes and Koster, 2021; Farhar et al., 2010; Gaur & Lang, 2020;
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Gross, 2020; Lovich & Ennen, 2011; Qi & Zhang, 2017; Tsoutsos et al., 2005; Turney
& Fthenakis, 2011).
The debate regarding utility-scale solar siting is particularly contentious in
Rhode Island (RI), which is the setting of our study. In 2004, RI adopted an ambitious
Renewable Energy Standard, which set the goal of generating 38.5% of total energy
from renewable sources by 2035. To this end, 80 MWs of utility-scale solar energy
capacity have been built since 2013 (EIA, 2021), and the pace of development has
increased recently (Kuffner, 2018). Much of the concern regarding solar energy
expansion stems from the fact that the most common sites for arrays are on forest and
farmlands. While these are the areas where development is cheapest, they offer many
amenities to residents, particularly in a small state with scarce land resources, the
nation’s second highest population density, and strong public support for land
conservation and environmental preservation (Altonji et al., 2016).
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the perceived externalities from utilityscale solar installations by estimating the tradeoffs people are willing to make for a set
of siting attributes. We designed a choice experiment (CE) and administered a survey
to estimate preferences for four siting attributes of utility-scale solar installations: size
of the installation, visibility, setback distance, and current land use of the proposed
development site. The four land types we consider are forest land, farmland,
commercial/industrial land, and brownfields/covered landfills, which represent
standard siting options. The survey presents respondents with multiple hypothetical
solar development plans with different attributes (including a no solar development
alternative) and asks their preferred option. Each alternative is paired with a change in
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household electricity bill, and thus respondents are making tradeoffs between money
and solar attributes. Through their choices, we can estimate an average monetary value
(willingness to pay, or WTP) for each solar siting attribute.
Our results are consistent with expectations, but the specific magnitudes of
willingness to pay yield insights into Rhode Islanders’ priorities. The results indicate
that respondents prefer larger installations and are willing to pay about $1.25 per
month per MW of solar energy capacity, which demonstrates overall support for
continued transition to solar energy. Respondents dislike visible installations and are
willing to pay between $6.21 and $8.42 per month to avoid a nearby installation that is
completely visible. Our results suggest the largest factor in determining approval is
current land use of the proposed development site, and there is substantial
heterogeneity across land types. Respondents have a preference for solar installations
sited on brownfields and commercial lands, with an average WTP between $10.08 to
$15.11 for brownfields and $14.48 to $20.78 for commercial areas. In stark contrast,
they are willing to pay to avoid solar development on forest lands and farmlands.
Conversion of forest land is most detested, and estimated WTP ranges from $40.60 to
$49.10 per month.
While these results are consistent with expectations and sentiment expressed in
town meetings and from stakeholders, they are important because they quantify
resident preferences in a way that can guide statewide policy and local siting
ordinances. Specifically, states can offer additional subsidies for solar development on
industrial/commercial areas, brownfields, and covered landfills, which are necessary
to entice developers because arrays on these sites are more expensive to build and
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maintain. Importantly, our analysis shows that economically meaningful subsidies are
highly likely to pass a benefit-cost analysis under reasonable assumptions and are thus
warranted in a social welfare framework. Visual screening is another important
component of development proposal and approval, and our results suggest that the
significant costs borne to screen an array are also justified by the benefits of residents
not seeing the array. We discuss these policy ramifications in Section 6 in more detail.
This study advances the literature in several ways. First, we provide the first
estimates of the valuation of utility-scale solar siting attributes in the United States.
Even beyond the United States, literature on non-market valuation of utility-scale solar
energy is sparse. To date, there are only four studies that use a CE to estimate
externalities from utility-scale solar: Botelho et al. (2017) in Portugal, Yang et al.
(2017) and Kim et al. (2020) in South Korea, and Oehlmann et al. (2021) in Germany.
Botelho et al., (2017) estimate a marginal WTP to avoid glare from solar panels of
$5.15 per month. Yang et al., (2017) also find a negative WTP for light pollution
caused by glass arrays, estimating a value of $14 per household per month. Our
finding that respondents need to be compensated between $6.21 and $8.42 per month
for a completely visible installation falls within the range estimated in previous
studies. Oehlmann et al. (2021) find that respondents in Germany prefer solar to wind
or biomass. Further, we are the first research in the solar siting literature to translate
household WTP estimates, the standard in this literature, into a more actionable unit of
measure that reflects subsidies in this area, specifically an aggregate WTP/kWh for an
installation.
Our second contribution, and the largest difference between our study and
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those prior, is our explicit distinction between possible prior land uses. Previous
studies all find that solar installations have a negative impact on the landscape, though
each defines the “landscape” attribute and its associated levels differently. Botelho et
al. (2017) consider a general kind of landscape without differentiating between land
use types and find that the average WTP to avoid “significant impacts on landscape” is
$7.58, relative to no impact. Similarly, Yang et al. (2017) also assume a general
definition of “landscape destruction” and define levels in terms of percentage
decreases in natural beauty. They estimate a WTP of $0.05 per percentage point of
landscape destruction. Kim et al. (2020) capture landscape impacts on flatlands
(farmlands and orchards) and mountainous areas and find that people need to be
compensated $1,951 per month for solar development on flatlands, and $1,059 per
month for solar on mountainous lands, compared to solar panels located on rooftop
and walls. Oehlmann et al. (2021) focus mostly on proximity and do not explicitly
describe prior land use. Further, the status quo still involves renewable energy
development, just of an uncertain type, which makes it unclear how respondents assess
land use impacts. While each study captures landscape impacts differently, none
estimate the impact of current land use on preferences for solar development in a way
that is theoretically rigorous (understanding that the perceived disamenity of solar
development is a function of the lost amenity values of the current land use) and
framed in a manner that is equally understandable to residents and actionable for
policy makers.
Lastly, our research contributes broadly to our understanding of NIMBYism,
which is loosely defined as when people approve of something in general, but do not
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want it near their residence. Objections to renewable energy siting are frequently
characterized (and maybe dismissed) as merely NIMBYism. However, this simplistic
view often does not hold up to scrutiny. Devine‐Wright, (2009) argues instead that
local opposition is about protecting places that people are attached to and derive
meaning and identity from. Boyle et al. (2019) conduct a choice experiment about
onshore wind energy siting and reject a NIMBY hypothesis because those that have
positive views of wind in general are more likely to choose development of wind
locally. We add additional nuance to this debate. Our respondents overwhelmingly
(87%) favor solar energy in general but are more discerning when it comes to local
projects, approving solar in only about 60% of choice tasks. These statistics alone
could indicate NIMBY attitudes, but our results tell a nuanced story that hinges on
land use. We find that people have positive WTP for local solar on brownfields and
commercial areas, but these same people require compensation for solar developed on
farm and forest lands. Thus, support is not driven exclusively by proximity, and so
does not render itself to a purely NIMBY explanation, but on other development plan
characteristics.

2 METHODS
2.1 Choice experiment design
In our CE, we present each respondent with six choice tasks modeled as solar
development plans. Each development plan asks respondents to consider a
hypothetical group of land parcels that have three main characteristics. First, all land
parcels are near each other and total fifty acres. Second, they are less than fifteen
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minutes from the respondent’s residence by car in Rhode Island. And third, each group
of parcels has one of the following four different land types: brownfield, commercial,
farmland, and privately owned forest. The survey presents two choice tasks for both
farmland and forest parcels, and one each for commercial and brownfield land types.
We chose to disproportionately ask about farmland and forest land because these are
more common siting locations in New England and the most contentious, so we
prioritized these for precise estimates.
Our CE design differs from much of the literature by treating current land use
differently than most choice attributes. In pilot testing our survey, we received
feedback from stakeholders suggesting that a realistic portrayal of solar development
decisions would involve different development plans on a single site (and so a single
current land use) rather than development plans involving different land uses. Another
concern, largely technical in nature, with the traditional CE design was that it was
unclear how land use should be coded for the status quo alternative (or the no solar
option) when multiple development options with different land uses were presented in
a single choice. We tackle this issue by keeping current land use constant between
different development plans in a given choice while varying land use between choices.
Econometrically, this means we are unable to include land use variables in our choice
model as one would include other attribute variables because they lack within-choice
variation. However, we are still able to recover the impact of land use differences from
our choice model by interacting land use indicator variables with alternative-specific
constants (ASCs). As such, our work highlights a method of including in a choice
design and estimating preferences for attributes that may not be credibly varied within
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a given choice set.
We develop a D-efficient design using Stata, which included 30 choice sets for
commercial and brownfield land types. The farm and forest land use designs included
60 choice sets, which were divided into blocks of two questions. In pilot testing the
survey, both with focus groups and with an advisory group of stakeholders
knowledgeable about solar development in Rhode Island, we identified several areas
where specific attribute levels did not make sense for certain land uses. In developing
our experimental design for each land use type, we specified these constraints, then
allowed our software to identify the D-efficient design given these constraints.
For each choice opportunity, we present three hypothetical development plans,
labeled A, B, and C. The first two plans assume that some or all of the parcels of land
under consideration will be developed into utility-scale solar installations, but with
varying solar installation characteristics. The final alternative (Choice C) is a statusquo option where the land will be free of solar panels and will remain in its current use
‘for the time being’.
Our CE presents four solar attributes: size of installation, visibility, setback,
and change in electricity bill. Size of installation indicates the area of land (in acres)
that is converted to solar energy production, and how many households are capable of
being powered by the installation under consideration. Visibility refers to how visible a
solar installation is from the respondents’ house or from regularly traveled roads.
Setback is the minimum distance of the solar panels from the property line. The
attribute representing our payment vehicle is change in electricity bill, which is
defined as the dollar increase or decrease in respondents’ electricity bill if a specific
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development plan is implemented. For ease of understanding, we present the change in
both monthly and annual terms. Finally, our CE also includes the attribute probability
of residential development when the land type is either farmland or forest. This is
because most farm and forest land is zoned residential in Rhode Island, and there is a
possibility that it will be converted into residential housing in the future if it is not
developed into solar. This attribute was added based on discussions in focus groups
and represents the reality that privately held land may not remain open space
indefinitely. Figure 1 shows an example choice set for the farmland land use.16 Table 1
defines all attributes and their associated levels used in our design.
Our survey is divided into four sections. The first section provides background
information about our study and the history of siting utility-scale solar installations in
Rhode Island. We convey that the objective of the study is to help policy makers
implement decisions that reflect the public’s preferences, and that the final results will
be disseminated to state and local decision makers and the public at large through
outreach.17 We also inform participants that our study is backed by an advisory group
consisting of officials in state and local governments, non-profit environmental
organizations, and solar development experts who have also provided guidance at
various stages of the project. In the second section we ask respondents questions
regarding their energy usage and attitudes about different energy sources. The third
section first defines each attribute in our CE and familiarizes respondents with its
overall structure using an example choice, then presents the six choice questions in a

16

Figures A1, A2, and A3 in the online appendix depict example choice sets for the forest, commercial
and brownfield land types, respectively. Each choice set was also accompanied by a picture depicting
prior land use, but we omit these in the figures out of copyright concern.
17
The grant that funded this work requires integration of research and extension.
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randomized order. The fourth and final section includes questions designed to assess
perceived consequentiality of the survey, identify stated attribute non-attendance, and
collect demographic information.

2.2 Empirical models
The choices made by respondents in our CE allow us to empirically estimate
their preferences for a variety of solar siting attributes. McFadden (1974) laid the
theoretical groundwork linking consumers’ choices to utility maximization through the
Random Utility Model (RUM). In the RUM context, the utility of individuals is
assumed to have two components: an observable and an unobservable (random)
component. This can be expressed as:
(1)

𝑈𝑖𝑚 = 𝑉𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚
where 𝑈𝑖𝑚 is the utility that respondent 𝑖 derives from alternative 𝑚, which is a

function of his observable utility 𝑉𝑖𝑚 and his random utility 𝜀𝑖𝑚 from choice 𝑚. The
observable component, Vim, can depend on individual-specific characteristics and the
attributes of alternative 𝑚.
We use the standard multinomial (conditional) logit (CL) model proposed by
McFadden (1974) to model respondents’ choices. The CL model requires that choices
be independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and makes two main assumptions: first,
that all individuals have homogenous preferences, and second, that the variance of the
error term is constant across individuals. In this case, that probability of individual 𝑖
choosing alternative 𝑚 is given by:
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑉𝑖𝑚 )

(2)

𝑃𝑖𝑚 = ∑𝑁

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑉𝑖𝑛 )
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where 𝜆 is a positive scale factor that is inversely proportional to the error variance,
𝜎𝜀2 :
𝜆=

𝜋

(3)

√6𝜎𝜀2

When error terms are IID, the error variance, and thus 𝜆, are constant across
individuals. Since the scale parameter cannot be directly estimated, it is typically
normalized to unity, an assumption that has been called into question in the literature
several times (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Hensher et al., 1998; J. Louviere et al.,
2002; J. J. Louviere, 2001).
To allow error variances (and scale parameters) to vary across individuals and
choices, we employ an alternative model known as the heteroskedastic conditional
logit (HCL) (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Hensher et al., 1998). In this model, scale
parameters are represented as:
(4)

𝜆𝑖𝑚 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝝋𝒁𝒊𝒎 )

where 𝒁𝒊𝒎 is a vector of individual- and choice-specific characteristics (specified as
the four different land use types in our model) and 𝜑 is the parameter that describes
the effect of those characteristics on the scale parameter. The probability of individual
𝑖 choosing alternative 𝑚 then becomes:
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑖𝑚 𝑽𝒊𝒎 )

(5)

𝑃𝑖𝑚 = ∑𝑀

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑖𝑚 𝑽𝒊𝒏 )

Finally, we use the random parameters logit (RPL), or mixed logit model,
which relaxes the IIA restrictions of the CL model and additionally allows for
preference heterogeneity. It does this by incorporating a random parameter into the
utility function that represents how much each individual’s preferences deviates from
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the population mean. Therefore, the utility each individual 𝑖 gets from alternative 𝑚 in
situation 𝑡 can be represented as:
𝑈𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 (𝜷 + 𝜼𝒊 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑚 = 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 (𝜷𝒊 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑚

(6)

where 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 represents the observed attributes, 𝜷 is a vector of mean coefficient values
associated with those attributes, and 𝜼𝒊 is a vector of individual-specific deviation
parameters that captures preference heterogeneity. Preference heterogeneity is
therefore captured directly in the RPL model through the vector 𝜷𝒊 , which represents
individual-specific preference parameters for each attribute with assumed preference
heterogeneity. The probability of individual 𝑖′𝑠 sequence of choices [𝑐1 , 𝑐2 , … . 𝑐𝑇 ] is
given by:
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 𝜷𝒊 )

𝑃𝑖[𝑐1 ,𝑐2 ,…𝑐𝑇 ] = ∫ … ∫ ∏𝑇𝑡 [∑𝑀

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝒊𝒏𝒕𝜷𝒊 )

] 𝑓 (𝜷)𝑑𝜷

(7)

2.3 Estimation
Our main expected utility specification is given as:
𝑉𝑖𝑚 = 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚 + 𝛽𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 + 𝛽𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚
+𝛽𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑚 + 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚
+ 𝛽𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑆𝐶 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 + 𝛽𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑆𝐶 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚
+ 𝛽𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐴𝑆𝐶 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚
+ 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑆𝐶 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚

(8)

where 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚 refers to the size of the installation (in acres), 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 and
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 are indicator variables equal to 1 if the installation is partly visible
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and completely visible,18 respectively, 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑚 refers to the setback distance (in
feet), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 is the probability of residential development on farm and forest
land in lieu of solar development, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚 is the change in respondents’ monthly
electricity bill, and 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 is the status-quo alternative-specific constant, or a dummy
variable equal to 1 for the status-quo choice and equal to 0 for either of the solar
development options (Choices A and B). 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 , 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 , and
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 are all dummy variables equal to 1 if the choice set is framed around
the respective land use.
In Equation (8), each solar attribute 𝑘 is associated with a preference
coefficient 𝛽𝑘 , which are estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. The
interaction coefficients allow us to identify whether respondents have different
preferences (and different WTP’s) for each land type. The 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 term indicates
respondent 𝑖’s desire to choose the status-quo alternative over other solar development
alternatives, which can also be interpreted as their dislike for solar arrays. The
interaction of the 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 term with a land use type 𝑙 will therefore represent their
preferences for developing solar arrays on that particular land use type. If the
coefficient associated with the interaction between land use type 𝑙 and the 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 term
(𝛽𝑙𝐴𝑆𝐶 ) is positive, it implies that people prefer the status-quo option over the other
alternatives, or equivalently that they dislike having solar arrays on the associated land
parcel, all else equal.
These coefficient estimates can be used to make welfare calculations. We
obtain the marginal WTP (MWTP) value for a particular attribute 𝑘 by dividing the

18

The omitted category is not visible at all.
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coefficient of that attribute with the negative of 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 , the coefficient associated with
the cost variable. Mathematically:
𝛽𝑘

(9)

𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 = − 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

We can also estimate the maximum WTP (also called compensating variation or CV)
for a specified plan by finding the price that makes the utility derived from that plan,
denoted as 𝑉𝑖1 , equal to the utility from the status quo option, denoted 𝑉𝑖𝑆𝑄_𝑙 . Note that
status quo utility is indexed by land use, as our interactions of the SQ ASC with land
use allows us to estimate different status-quo utilities for different land uses. From
here we can estimate a unique CV for each land use type 𝑙:
𝐶𝑉𝑙 =

𝑉 𝑆𝑄_𝑙 − 𝑉 1∗

(10)

𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

where 𝑉 1∗ is the utility of the non-price attributes associated with the solar
development plan under consideration. Subtracting the CV associated with one land
use type from another gives us the premium the average respondent would pay for
switching solar panels from one current land use to the other.

3 DATA
3.1 Survey implementation
We use the Tailored Design Method formulated by Dillman et al. (2014) to
design a mixed-mode, web-push survey. The mixed mode aspect enables us to collect
data both online (using Qualtrics) and through mail, allowing for a higher response
rate and greater sample representativeness (Millar and Dillman, 2011). The web-push
aspect allows us to contact potential respondents by mail and invite them to take the

66

survey online, which lowers per-respondent cost (McMaster et al., 2017).
We drew a random sample of 3,000 individuals from the 2019 Rhode Island
voter registration database, which is publicly available from the Secretary of State.
These data include name, address, age, party affiliation, and whether the individual
participated in the last eight elections held. Sample selection probabilities were
adjusted to increase the odds of selecting younger people, those living in rural areas,
and Republicans. Republicans were oversampled because they are a smaller group in
Rhode Island and have been found to be less responsive to surveys (Best and Krueger,
2012; Pearson-Merkowitz and Lang, 2020). Rural residents were oversampled because
they are more likely to be impacted by solar siting decisions. We oversampled younger
residents because we anticipated lower response rates from them.
We disseminated the survey in three rounds. The first round was mailed on
September 4, 2020. Each envelope included an introductory letter that provided a link
and unique access code to the online survey and a $2 cash incentive. Two weeks later,
non-respondents were sent a follow-up postcard as a reminder, which also gave the
link and access code. In the third and final round (mailed two weeks after the second
round), subjects who had not responded to either of the first two rounds of mailings
were sent a paper survey along with a prepaid, pre-addressed return envelope.
Of the 3,000 surveys that were mailed, 204 were returned as non-deliverable.
We received 669 total responses (24% response rate), 510 of which came from the
online mode and 159 from mail. We drop 13 individuals who do not answer any of the
choice questions. Our final sample consists of 3,914 choices made by 656
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individuals.19
3.2 Summary statistics
Summary statistics of respondent characteristics are presented in Table 2. The
average annual household income is $109,250 and the average monthly electricity bill
is $123.57. About 68% of the respondents have a college degree or higher, 63% are
employed, and 52% are female. A large proportion of respondents are homeowners
(83%), 35% have children at home, and the average tenure in their current home is
over 15 years. About 5% of subjects have solar panels installed in their own homes.
On average, they have a very positive attitude towards renewable energy sources
(solar, wind, and hydro). Specifically, 87% of respondents have a positive view of
solar energy in general. In contrast, respondents are neutral towards natural gas and
dislike energy production from nuclear materials and coal. These attitudes are
consistent with recent nationwide studies that find immense support for developing
alternative energy over expanding fossil fuels in the U.S (McDonald et al., 2020; Pew
Research Center, 2020). Finally, over 90% of subjects find the survey to be
consequential with regards to policy decisions and the payment vehicle.20
To make our sample representative of the Rhode Island population, we use the
voter registration data to construct sample weights. Three key demographic variables
are used to construct weights: age, political affiliation, and rural/urban residence.

19

Only 36 respondents chose the status quo alternative in all six choice questions, giving us a serial
non-participation rate of 5.5%, which is considerably lower than other studies (Chen et al., 2020; von
Haefen et al., 2005). This finding suggests that respondents are engaging with the subject and not
dismissing it outright. Figure A4 in the online appendix depicts respondents’ choice preferences for the
status quo and solar development alternatives by land use.
20
Following Carson and Groves (2007) and Herriges et al. (2010), we use a knife-edge definition of
consequentiality where policy consequentiality is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondents believe
that their answers will influence policies. Likewise, payment consequentiality is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if respondents believe that they will have to pay with any positive probability.
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Table 3 reports the demographic distribution for these three variables in our
unweighted sample, the population, and the weighted sample. The unweighted sample
means differ from the population means across all groups, which is due to our
disproportionate sampling and various groups’ propensity to respond to the survey.
However, the application of survey weights balances the proportions exactly.

4 RESULTS
Table 4 reports the estimation results for our main specification. In Column 1
we present coefficients from the CL model. Column 2 shows coefficients derived from
estimating the HCL model, along with scale parameter estimates associated with farm,
forest, and commercial land use types.21 Columns 3 and 4 report mean coefficient and
standard deviation estimates, respectively, from the RPL model, which is our preferred
specification because of its more realistic assumptions regarding preference
heterogeneity. Results are consistent across columns. We find that the coefficient on
𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 is positive and significant (at 1%), implying that respondents prefer large solar
installations. They also dislike installations that are visible, as suggested by the
negative sign on 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 and 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. However, only the coefficient on
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is significant (at 1%), indicating that completely visible installations
elicit a stronger negative reaction than partly visible ones. The coefficient on 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘
is positive across the board, insignificant in the CL and HCL models, and only weakly
significant (at the 10% level) in the RPL model. This suggests that people are

Coefficients for land use in “Heteroskedastic variables” portion of this model are read as the change
in scale parameter (or, more specifically, the change in the exponent of the scale parameter) for the land
use relative to the omitted land use, which is brownfield.
21
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unaffected by setback distance when controlling for the visibility of the installation.
This is also likely because respondents consider setback distance to be the least
important attribute while making choices (Figure A5 in the online appendix).
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is negative and significant at the 1% level, which means that people are
less likely to choose an option when the probability of residential development is
higher. Since the only options in our design with nonzero probability of residential
development are status-quo options when forests or farmlands are the current land use,
the implication is that respondents are less likely to select the status-quo (and so more
interested in solar development) if the land is more likely to be converted to housing in
the near future, which is consistent with expectations.
We find that preferences for constructing solar installations differ by the type
of land use under consideration. The positive and significant coefficient on
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 in the CL and HCL models suggests that respondents’ prefer the statusquo for this land use type, and thus dislike having solar arrays built on farmlands. The
corresponding mean estimate for the RPL model is positive and significant only at the
10% confidence level, though the large and significant SD value implies that people
exhibit large variation in their preferences regarding solar installations on farmlands.
The coefficient on 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 is positive and highly significant across all models,
providing strong evidence of people’s dislike for developing forest lands for solar
energy. Similar to farmlands, we find evidence of large variation in respondents’
preferences for converting forest land into solar installations, as indicated by the large
and significant SD values associated with the 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 term. The negative and
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients on the 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 and
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𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 interaction terms indicate that, in general, people like having
solar installations on brownfields and commercial land types.
In Panel A of Table 5 we present MWTP estimates for all attributes with
standard errors derived using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. On average,
respondents are willing to pay $0.24 to $0.28 per month for each additional acre of
land to be developed for solar. This translates to a monthly WTP between $7.20 and
$8.40 for a 30 acre installation and between $12 and $14 for a 50 acre one, which, in a
basic sense, is consistent with overall support for solar energy and general subsidies
for solar energy. We find that the MWTP for a partly visible installation is negative,
though insignificant, and small in magnitude. The MWTP for a fully visible
installation is significant and much larger in magnitude, which suggests that
respondents need to be compensated between $6.21 and $8.43 per month for solar
installations that are completely visible, compared with not visible. Values for the
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 attribute are insignificant for the CL and HCL models, and slightly
significant (at the 10% level) for the RCL model. However, the magnitude is small
throughout, implying that respondents are largely unaffected by setback distance. The
MWTP for 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is negative and significant, indicating less compensation is
needed for solar developed on farm and forest lands when the probability of future
residential development increases. In addition, these estimates can be interpreted as
MWTP for permanent land conservation. On average, respondents are willing to pay
between $4.75 and $11.25 per month for a 25% reduction in the probability of future
residential development, and between $9.50 and $22.50 per month for a 50%
reduction. Translating these monthly payments in perpetuity into present discounted
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value yields amounts that are similar to property values studies on the capitalization of
conserved open space (Irwin, 2002; Lang, 2018). Our MWTP estimates are also
broadly similar to various contingent valuation studies estimating the value of
farmland and forest conservation across several countries (Jin et al., 2018; Lehtonen et
al., 2003; Shoyama et al., 2013).
Panel B of Table 5 reports CV estimates for the development of solar on
various land types. We assume a 10 acre solar installation that is completely visible,
has a setback distance of 150 feet and with a 0% probability of residential
development in the future. Our results provide suggestive evidence of respondents’
dislike for constructing solar panels on farmland. Estimates from the CL and HCL
models suggest that people need to be compensated almost $23 per month when
farmland are converted to solar installations. In comparison, the RPL estimate of
$13.22 per month is smaller in magnitude, though it is still negative and significant.
We find large negative WTP values for constructing solar on forest lands, which
indicates a strong dislike for such siting. On average, people need to be compensated
between $40.58 and $49.04 per month for the development of forest land into solar.
We also find positive WTP values for 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 and 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑, implying that
respondents support converting these types of lands into solar installations. Our results
indicate that people are willing to pay between $14.43 and $20.72 per month in higher
energy bills for solar development on commercial lands and range from $10.06 to
$15.07 per month on brownfields.
Given the dominance of land use in determining project approval, we
additionally investigate whether attribute preferences vary by land use. We split the
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sample of choice tasks by land types revealed to be desirable (commercial and
brownfield) and undesirable (farmland and forest), and we estimate Equation (8) on
each sample separately. Table 6 presents WTP values for solar attributes for the farm
and forest subsample in Column 1 and for the commercial and brownfield subsample
in Column 2.22
We find several differences across columns that reveal how land use impacts
MWTP for attributes. While respondents are indifferent about the size of the
installation when built on farm and forest lands, they are willing to pay $0.38 for each
additional acre of solar on commercial and brownfield land. The latter translates to a
monthly WTP of $11.40 for a 30 acre installation and $19 for a 50 acre one. Visibility
is more of a concern to respondents for farm and forest sites than on commercial and
brownfield sites. Respondents are willing to pay $3.38 to avoid seeing a partially
visible installation on farm and forest lands, whereas the corresponding value for
commercial and brownfields is small and statistically insignificant. While completely
visible arrays are disliked regardless of the land type on which they are sited,
respondents’ dislike is stronger for fully visible installations on farms and forest lands.
Their monthly WTP to avoid seeing fully visible installations on commercial and
brownfield areas is $4.42 but is $10.34 for installations on farm and forest lands,
which is a ratio of about 2:5. Respondents also prefer greater setback for solar in
commercial and brownfield areas, though the result is only marginally significant.
MWTP for reduced probability of residential development and CV estimates in Panel
B are consistent with our main results.

22

The conditional logit regression coefficients that are used to create Table 6 are presented in Table A1
of the online appendix.
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Purely for comparison purposes, we also develop a model that does not
account for land use differences and present the results in Tables A2 and A3 of the
online appendix. The results present an inconsistent picture of overall approval: Total
WTP switches signs across specifications. These results suggest that failure to
adequately control for current land use can obscure strong preferences for and against
specific types of solar development, thus underscoring the importance of including
current land use in the discussion surrounding the siting of solar installations.

5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to stimulate solar growth and achieve renewable energy targets, Rhode
Island buys renewable energy from producers at a premium to offset the higher
levelized cost than conventional sources. However, the incentives offered to solar
developers are constant regardless of the attributes of the project. Given the additional
costs of developing on commercial/industrial areas, brownfields, and covered landfills,
the constant incentive essentially encourages solar development on farm and forest
lands. In addition, visual barriers from landscaping or other means are additional costs
to developers, and thus may be insufficiently provided.
Several New England and Mid-Atlantic states do offer differentiated subsidies
based on prior land use (see Knight et al. 2020 for a review). The most common is an
additional incentive for parking lot canopies. For example, Massachusetts offers an
additional $0.06/kWh and Maryland offers up to $400 per kW of installed capacity.
Rhode Island undertook a pilot project in 2020 offering a $0.06/kWh adder for a single
solar parking lot canopy development (RIPUC, n.d.). Several states similarly offer
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differentiated rates for solar built on brownfields and covered landfills. In the case of
Massachusetts, this is a $0.03/kWh and $0.04/kWh adder, respectively. Vermont offers
financial resources for assessment and cleanup of contaminated sites. Massachusetts
additionally uses disincentives for solar sited on forest land. The deduction increases
with the size of the installation, but as an example a 5 MW array would receive a
deduction of $0.015/kWh from the standard incentive (MA-Smart Solar, n.d.). While
these differentiated incentives are certainly in line with our estimates of preferences
across land types, it is unclear whether they pass a benefit-cost test or if similar
differentiated incentives enacted in Rhode Island would pass a benefit-cost test.
While the results presented in Section 5 indicate welfare impacts to households
from various solar siting decisions, we additionally seek to use our results to inform
policy. As illustrated above, many policy actions take the form of per kWh incentives
or disincentives, so that is how we structure our analysis here. Table 7 presents the
logical steps of converting our household valuation results into per kWh incentives for
various policy actions that are costly to developers but preferred by residents (i.e.,
moving development from forest land to commercial land). The goal is to develop
incentives that are justified based on residents’ preferences. We conduct this exercise
based on a 2 MW array. Column 1 is monthly household WTP for each policy action
and is calculated from Column 3, Panel B of Table 5. Column 2 is this household WTP
per kWh of production. This equals Column 1 divided by 237,600 kWh, which is
expected monthly electricity generation from a 2 MW array with a capacity factor of
16.5%.
The remaining columns aggregate WTP across households within a given
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distance (0.5, 1, 3 miles) of a hypothetical solar array. The number of households
within a given distance is approximated using census data for the whole state of Rhode
Island. We present multiple distances because it is uncertain what the appropriate
aggregation level is. A distance of 0.5 miles might approximate the size of an area in
which residents are likely to frequently encounter a solar array. Another measure of
proximity stems from two studies that find that property value impacts extend to about
one mile: Gaur and Lang (2020) in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and Abashidze
(2019) in North Carolina. Often solar developments are hotly debated at town
meetings, and the average town in Rhode Island has an approximate radius of three
miles, so we present that as an upper bound.
The results suggest that, even for conservative definitions of impacted
households, substantial incentives are justified. For example, aggregating over only
residents within 0.5 miles, an additional incentive of $0.07/kWh is justified if a solar
array development is moved from forest land to commercial land. Similarly, an
additional incentive of $0.06/kWh is justified if a solar array development is moved
from forest land to a brownfield. Incentives to displace development on farmland are
smaller at $0.03/kWh. Incentives for visibility screening come in around $0.01/kWh.
As the distance of impacted households grows, so do the incentives justified, reaching
excessive levels for this context (i.e., $2.47/kWh for moving a development from
forest to commercial).
These incentives can additionally be altered to reflect the reality of
development proposals. For instance, a developer cannot credibly declare they would
build on forest land, but are now building on a brownfield, and so deserve a
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$0.06/kWh added incentive. One option would be to place a $0.03/kWh added
incentive on brownfields, and a reduced feed-in-tariff of $0.03/kWh if an array is sited
on forest lands. This combination would mirror resident preferences for land types.
When it comes to screening, landscaping typically is an upfront fixed cost, and thus
would not need an ongoing per kWh incentive. However, vegetative (or even artificial)
buffers can deteriorate over the 25 year lifetime of an array if not tended, thus an
annual verification of visual screening to qualify for a small incentive (per kWh or a
flat fee) could be appropriate.
As mentioned above, our calculations in Table 7 use a 2 MW capacity. As
capacity grows, production grows, and subsidies decline. Since household WTP values
are independent of any assumptions of solar attributes, only electricity generation will
be affected when we assume an installation with a different capacity. Therefore, the
WTP/kWh values will decrease in proportion to the size of the assumed installation. In
Appendix Table A4, we present an analogous version of Table 6 using a 6 MW
capacity installation instead. Justified incentives are substantially smaller, however,
this may be appropriate as levelized cost goes down as capacity increases (RIPUC,
n.d.).

6 CONCLUSION
This paper quantifies the externalities of utility-scale solar installations by
analyzing RI residents’ tradeoffs for six solar siting attributes: size of the installation,
visibility, setback distance, probability of future residential development, change in
electricity bill, and current land use of the proposed solar site. We collect data using a
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survey that was distributed to a random sample of 2,794 RI residents. Our final sample
consists of 3,936 choices made by 656 respondents.
We use a CE framework and logistic regression models to estimate
respondents’ WTP for each attribute. MWTP values indicate that Rhode Islanders like
large installations and are willing to pay $0.28 for each additional acre of land to be
developed for solar energy. However, respondents dislike fully visible installations and
need to be compensated $8.43 for the same. We find no significant impacts from
setback distance and partly visible installations, suggesting that respondents are
unaffected by these attributes. When the probability of future residential development
increases, they are less likely to choose the status quo alternative of no solar
development.
Assuming a 10 acre, fully visible installation with a setback distance of 150
feet and 0% probability of future residential development, we obtain total WTP values
for solar development on different land types. Our results indicate substantial
heterogeneity in preferences for constructing solar installations by current land use of
a proposed solar site. Overall, respondents dislike solar development on farmlands and
forests, and need to be compensated $13 to $49 per month for the change. However,
they support solar development on brownfields and commercial land types and are
willing to pay an additional $15 to $19 per month to have solar installations
constructed there. It is important to remember that our sample respondents
overwhelmingly have positive attitudes towards solar energy. Our results provide
nuance to that favorability. Concerns heard about solar developments in town
meetings and stakeholder groups are not likely blanket NIMBY concerns, but instead
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are concerns about land use change and other important priorities.
We conclude with calculations and a discussion about how our results can be
converted to policy relevant parameters. The incentives and disincentives will promote
solar development that is consistent with residents’ preferences. As Rhode Island and
other states seek to meet renewable energy objectives, assessment and incorporation of
residents’ preferences are critical to ensure ongoing support.
This research extends the literature on both preferences for utility-scale
renewable electricity generation and preferences for land conservation in a manner
that is relevant to stakeholders and residents as well as actionable for policy makers.
We model land use in the solar siting choice in a way that is intuitive, clear, and
obviously resonant to Rhode Islanders. We also extend our analysis beyond traditional
household WTP estimates to frame resident preferences in a way that mirrors the units
of subsidy for utility scale installations. This research also hints at important future
extensions in this area. Spatial heterogeneity of preferences likely exists in this area
and has been shown relevant to preferences for land conservation in other contexts
(Czajkowski et al., 2016). Modeling how preferences vary by spatial distance is an
important extension of this work and will help shed light on which spatial aggregation
ranges from Table 7 are most appropriate when determining incentives.
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Figures and tables

Figure 1: Example choice question

Parcel 1: Farmland
Consider a group of privately-owned land parcels that totals 50 acres and are currently
used as farmland. These parcels are in Rhode Island and less than 15 minutes from your
residence by car. Below are two possible solar development plans for these farmland
parcels. Policy makers can approve either plan, or they can reject both plans and have
no solar installation on the parcels.
Please examine the three options below and indicate which option you prefer.
CHOICE A

CHOICE B

10 acres
(generates enough
power for 320
homes)

30 acres
(generates enough
power for 960
homes)

Visibility

Visible

Not visible

Setback

100 ft

50 ft

Probability of
residential
development

0%

0%

50%

Change in
monthly
electricity bill
(annual)

$10 increase
($120 annual ↑)

$10 decrease
($120 annual ↓)

No change

A

B

C

Size of
installation

YOUR
CHOICE
[Please check
ONE box only]
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CHOICE C

NO SOLAR
PANELS



Table 1: Attribute definitions and levels
Attribute
Definition
Size of
The size of the solar installation in
installation
acres.
Visibility
Visibility of a solar installation from a
respondent's house or from regularly
traveled roads.
a
Setback
Minimum distance of the solar panels
from the property line.
Probability of
The likelihood that the land being
residential
considered will be developed into
developmentb
residential housing in the next ten years
if a solar installation is not built.
Change in
The dollar increase or decrease in a
c
electricity bill
respondent's monthly electricity bill if
the parcel is converted to solar power
generation.
Current land used
a) Farmland
The land is currently used to grow
agricultural crops. In this case, solar
installations would be built on the
ground.
b) Forest
The land is currently privately-owned
forest land. In this case, trees will be
clear cut and solar installations would
be built on the ground.
c) Commercial The land is either currently used for
business activities, including buildings
and parking lots, or undeveloped land
that is zoned for commercial purposes.
In this case, solar installations could be
built on the ground, on building
rooftops, or as a parking lot canopy.
d) Brownfield A former industrial or commercial site
where future use is affected by real or
perceived environmental contamination.
These could include capped landfills
and quarries. In this case, solar
installations would be built on the
ground.

Levels
10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Not visible, Partially
visible, Completely
visible
0, 50, 100, 250
0%, 25%, 50%

-$30, -$20, -$10, -$5,
$5, $10, $20, $30

Notes: a Setback level of 0 feet is excluded for farm and forest land use types.
b
Probability of residential development is excluded when the land use type is commercial or
brownfield.
c
For the commercial and brownfield land types, the levels of -$30, -$20, and -$10 are excluded.
d
Current land varies across choice tasks but is constant across alternatives within each choice
task.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of survey respondents
Variable
Mean
SD
Minimum Maximum Observations
Household income (000's)
109.25 50.96
15
175
601
College educated (1 = yes)
0.68
0.47
0
1
649
Children at home (1 = yes)
0.35
0.48
0
1
646
Female (1 = yes)
0.52
0.50
0
1
656
Homeowner (1 = yes)
0.83
0.38
0
1
647
Years living in current home
15.51
6.55
3
20
651
Employed (1 = yes)
0.63
0.48
0
1
650
Electricity bill ($/month)
123.57 54.88
25
200
646
Solar panels at home (1 =
yes)
0.05
0.23
0
1
647
Energy attitudes (1 =
positive)
Solar
0.87
0.33
0
1
649
Offshore wind
0.80
0.40
0
1
640
Onshore wind
0.76
0.43
0
1
638
Hydro
0.68
0.47
0
1
637
Natural gas
0.52
0.50
0
1
642
Nuclear
0.26
0.44
0
1
627
Coal
0.08
0.28
0
1
638
Consequentiality (1 =
positive)
Policy
0.91
0.29
0
1
656
Payment
0.90
0.29
0
1
656
Notes: All data come from survey responses. Household income and electricity bill values come from a
multiple choice question that included several ranges. We assign people the middle value of their chosen
range.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for sampling weighting variables
Unweighted sample Population
Location Rural (%)
73.32
50.62
Urban (%)
26.68
49.38
Age

Party

18 - 39 (%)
40 - 59 (%)
60+ (%)

Democrat (%)
Republican (%)
Independent (%)
Number of observations

Weighted sample
50.62
49.38

23.93
33.84
42.23

33.69
31.83
34.49

33.69
31.83
34.49

34.76
19.21
46.04
656

39.73
12.20
48.07
778,666

39.73
12.20
48.07
656

Notes: Data come from Rhode Island voter registration database. All values are represented as
percentages of the total number of observations.
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Table 4: Attribute coefficients from logit regressions
Conditional Heteroscedastic
Variable
Logit
Logit
Acres
0.010***
0.018***
(0.002)
(0.004)
PartVisibility
-0.066
-0.067
(0.061)
(0.085)
FullVisibility
-0.313***
-0.406***
(0.074)
(0.103)
Setback (00's ft)
0.042
0.066
(0.031)
(0.042)
Probability
-0.008***
-0.014***
(0.002)
(0.004)
Cost ($/month)
-0.043***
-0.065***
(0.002)
(0.007)
Land use ASC
interactions
Farm × ASC
0.822***
1.407***
(0.135)
(0.268)
Forest × ASC
1.596***
2.988***
(0.134)
(0.465)
Brownfield × ASC
-0.793***
-0.782***
(0.128)
(0.148)
Commercial × ASC
-1.035***
-1.068***
(0.132)
(0.190)
Heteroskedastic
variables
Farm
-0.450***
(0.122)
Forest
-0.704***
(0.142)
Commercial
-0.026
(0.138)
Choices
11,724
11,724
Respondents
656
656
AIC
7389.010
7347.585
BIC
7462.704
7443.387

Random Parameters logit
Mean
SD
0.016***
0.044***
(0.003)
(0.004)
-0.127
0.154
(0.083)
(0.279)
-0.546***
0.801***
(0.111)
(0.196)
0.079*
0.293***
(0.044)
(0.109)
-0.029***
0.077***
(0.007)
(0.014)
-0.065***
(0.004)
0.590*
(0.333)
2.910***
(0.374)
-1.232***
(0.165)
-1.517***
(0.167)

3.859***
(0.600)
4.161***
(0.560)
0.338
(0.217)
0.045
(0.220)

11,724
656
6615.204
6755.223

Note: Acres refers to the size of the solar installation in acres. Part visibility and Full visibility are
dummy variables = 1 if a solar installation is partially or completely visible, respectively. ASC is the
status-quo alternative-specific constant, or a dummy variable = 1 for the status-quo choice and 0
otherwise. Cost is in terms of USD per household per month. Sample weights are applied and
constructed using stepwise adjustment on three variables: age, political affiliation, and rural/urban
residence. Standard errors, clustered by respondent, are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Marginal willingness to pay estimates for solar attributes
Conditional Heteroskedastic
Random
Attribute
logit
logit
parameters logit
Panel A: Marginal WTP
Acres
$0.24***
$0.28***
$0.25***
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.05)
PartVisibility
-$1.54
-$1.03
-$1.96
(1.44)
(1.34)
(1.27)
FullVisibility
-$7.30***
-$6.21***
-$8.43***
(1.75)
(1.50)
(1.63)
Setback (00's ft)
$0.98
$1.01
$1.21*
(0.71)
(0.62)
(0.68)
Probability
-$0.19***
-$0.22***
-$0.45***
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.11)
Panel B: Total WTP
Farmland
-$22.54***
-$23.43***
-$13.22***
(2.67)
(2.63)
(5.01)
Forest
-$40.58***
-$47.62***
-$49.04***
(2.76)
(4.08)
(5.36)
Commercial
$20.72***
$14.43***
$19.32***
(3.09)
(2.45)
(2.71)
Brownfield
$15.07***
$10.06***
$14.91***
(2.89)
(2.29)
(2.58)
Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per household per month. Estimates in Panel A represent
marginal WTP values. In Panel B, the estimates represent total WTP values and assume a 10
acre, fully visible installation with a setback of 150 feet, and a 0% probability of development in
the future. In both panels, standard errors are calculated using the bootstrap method (with 1000
replications) and are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99%
level, respectively.
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Table 6: Marginal willingness to pay estimates for solar attributes estimated
separately by land types
Farm and Forest
Commercial and Brownfield
Attribute
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Marginal WTP
Acres
$0.08
$0.38***
(0.07)
(0.06)
PartVisibility
-$3.38*
$0.28
(1.99)
(1.81)
FullVisibility
-$10.34***
-$4.42**
(2.68)
(1.74)
Setback (00's ft)
$0.18
$1.35*
(1.09)
(0.84)
Probability
-$0.21***
(0.06)
Panel B: Total WTP
Farmland
-$21.63***
(3.64)
Forest
-$41.63***
(3.91)
Commercial
$13.49***
(2.41)
Brownfield
$9.30***
(2.25)
Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per household per month. Estimates in Panel A represent
marginal WTP values. In Panel B, the estimates represent total WTP values and assume a 10
acre, fully visible installation with a setback of 150 feet, and a 0% probability of development
in the future. In both panels, standard errors are calculated using the bootstrap method (with
1000 replications) and are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and
99% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Developing solar siting incentives justified by residents’ preferences

Policy Action
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Forest to Commercial
Forest to Brownfield
Farm to Commercial
Farm to Brownfield
Fully visible to partly visible
Fully visible to not visible

Household
WTP

Household
WTP/kWh

(1)
$68.36
$63.95
$32.54
$28.13
$6.47
$8.43

(2)
$0.00029
$0.00027
$0.00014
$0.00012
$0.00003
$0.00004

Aggregate WTP/kWh
Median
Median
Median
households
households
households
within 0.5 miles within 1 mile
within 3 miles
(3)
(4)
(5)
$0.07
$0.27
$2.47
$0.06
$0.26
$2.31
$0.03
$0.13
$1.18
$0.03
$0.11
$1.02
$0.01
$0.03
$0.23
$0.01
$0.03
$0.30

Notes: Household WTP values in Column 1 are derived from Column 3 of Table 5. The WTP for switching solar development from one
land type to another is calculated by subtracting the total WTP for the former land type from the latter. The WTP for converting a fully
visible installation into a partly visible one is obtained by subtracting the WTP for a partly visible installation from the WTP for a fully
visible installation, and then changing the sign from negative to positive. The WTP for making a fully visible installation not visible at all is
the negative of the marginal WTP estimate of 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. Column 2 values are calculated by dividing Column 1 by expected monthly
electricity generation from a 2 MW installation. Columns 3, 4, and 5 take the household WTP/kwh values from Column 2 and aggregate
them over the median number of households within a radius of 0.5, 1, 3 miles respectively. Based on population density from the 2010 RI
Census, we calculate the median number of households within an area equivalent to 0.5 miles from a solar array is 239, within 1 mile is
955, and within 3 miles is 8,599.

Appendix
This appendix provides supplemental figures and tables to our main results.
Figures A1, A2, and A3 depict example choice questions for the forest, commercial,
and brownfield land types, respectively.
Figure A4 presents the proportion of respondents that chose the status quo and the
solar development plans across different types of land use. For forested land, more
respondents chose the status quo option over solar development. For brownfield and
commercial land types, a large majority (almost 80%) choose solar development over
the status quo option.
Figure A5 represents the importance of each attribute for the respondents while
making their decisions. Land use is the most important, which underscores the
importance of including current land use in the context of solar siting. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 is the
least important, which explains the insignificant coefficient associated with it across
all models.
Table A1 presents conditional logit regression estimates derived by estimating
Equation (8) on two types of lands: desirable (farmland and forest), and undesirable
(commercial and brownfield) in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. We find that the
coefficient on 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 is insignificant for farm and forest land types, but highly
significant (at the 1% level) and positive for commercial and brownfield land types,
implying that respondents prefer larger solar installations only on undesirable land
types. The coefficient on 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 for the farm and forest column is negative,
suggesting that responds dislike partly visible installations on those lands, though the
coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. However, they have no such preference
for installations on commercial and brownfield lands (positive and insignificant
coefficient). Fully visible installations are disliked regardless of current land use,
implying that solar installations cause significant visual disamenities wherever they
may be sited. The coefficient on 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 is positive and significant (at the 10% level)
for commercial and brownfield land types only. This could represent respondents’
willingness to remain distant from undesirable land types. The coefficient on
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is negative and significant at the 1% level, similar to our main results,
implying that as the probability of future residential development increases, people
become less likely to choose the status quo option. The positive and significant
coefficients on the 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 and 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 interaction terms, and the
negative and significant ones on the 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶
terms are in line with our main results: that respondents dislike solar installations on
farms and forest lands but support their construction on commercial and brownfield
lands.
Table A2 presents the coefficients derived from estimating a basic model with no land
use-ASC interaction terms. The coefficients on 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, and
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, are qualitatively similar to our main results, with respondents
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demonstrating a liking for large installations that are not visible. The sign of the
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 coefficient is inconsistent across models, though it is insignificant throughout
implying that the average respondent is unaffected by setback distance. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
is significant and positive, which is in contrast to our main results, but makes sense in
this context. Since this model does not differentiate between land use, the only way
respondents’ preference for keeping the status-quo for farm and forest lands can be
captured is by having a positive coefficient for 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, which takes positive
values only when the land use is forest or farmland. The 𝐴𝑆𝐶 coefficient is
inconsistent across models in both sign and significance. It is positive and insignificant
in the CL model, negative and significant in the HCL and RPL models. The negative
sign indicates that respondents prefer to choose a solar development plan over
maintaining the status quo. This result is not surprising, given that over 80% of the
subjects in our sample support solar energy. However, the large and significant SD
value in the RPL model indicates that there is some heterogeneity in their preferences
that remains unexplained, which we examine in our main specification with land use
interactions.
Table A3 presents welfare estimates derived from our basic model with delta standard
errors. As with our main model, we consider a 10 acre solar installation with full
visibility, 150 feet setback distance and 0% probability of future residential
development. The MWTP values for 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠ibility, and 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, are
quite similar in both sign and magnitude compared to our main results. For 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘,
the MWTP is negative for the CL and the RPL models, and positive for the HCL
model, though insignificant throughout. We find that respondents’ MWTP for
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is positive and significant, a result that is opposite to our main results.
Finally, without accounting for the differences in land use, we find that our CV
estimates are inconsistent across different models. The CL estimate is negative and
significant at the 1% level, indicating that respondents need to be compensated $8.29
for the construction of the particular solar installation under consideration. However,
the CLH estimate implies a positive WTP of $4.27 per month for the same kind of
installation (though it is insignificant). The RPL value is negative and insignificant.
Not only do these results underestimate the compensation levels for when construction
happens on forest lands, but also the respondents’ positive WTP for solar development
on commercial land and brownfields.
Table A4 replicates table 6 of our main manuscript but assumes electricity generation
from a 6 MW installation. The incentives are smaller than our main results for all
levels of aggregation but may still be realistic since levelized costs go down as
capacity increases.
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Figure A1: Example choice question for forest land parcels

Parcel 2: Forest
Consider a group of privately-owned forested land parcels that total 50 acres and are
currently undeveloped. These parcels are in Rhode Island and less than 15 minutes
from your residence by car. Below are two possible solar development plans for these
forest parcels. Policy makers can approve either plan, or they can reject both plans and
have no solar installation on the parcels.
Please examine the three options below and indicate which option you prefer.
CHOICE A

CHOICE B

20 acres
(generates enough
power for 640
homes)

50 acres
(generates enough
power for 1,600
homes)

Visibility

Completely visible

Partially visible

Setback

100 ft

50 ft

Probability of
residential
development

0%

0%

50%

Change in
monthly
electricity bill
(annual)

$5 increase
($60 annual ↑)

$15 decrease
($180 annual ↓)

No change

A

B

C

Size of
installation

YOUR
CHOICE
[Please check
ONE box only]
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CHOICE C

NO SOLAR
PANELS



Figure A2: Example choice question for commercial land parcels

Parcel 3: Commercial land
Consider a group of privately-owned land parcels that total 50 acres and are currently
used or zoned as commercial land. These parcels are in Rhode Island and less than 15
minutes from your residence by car. Below are two possible solar development plans
for these commercial parcels. Policy makers can approve either plan, or they can reject
both plans and have no solar installation on the parcels.
Please examine the three options below and indicate which option you prefer.
CHOICE A

CHOICE B

30 acres
(generates
enough power
for 960 homes)

50 acres
(generates enough
power for 1,600
homes)

Visibility

Partially visible

Completely visible

Setback

50 ft

100 ft

$15 increase
($180 annual ↑)

$20 increase
($240 annual ↑)

No change

A

B

C







Size of
installation

Change in
monthly
electricity bill
(annual)
YOUR
CHOICE
[Please check
ONE box only]
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CHOICE C

NO SOLAR
PANELS

Figure A3: Example choice question for brownfield land parcels

Parcel 4: Brownfield
Consider a group of privately-owned land parcels that total 50 acres and are currently
brownfields. These parcels are in Rhode Island and less than 15 minutes from your
residence by car. Below are two possible solar development plans for these brownfield
parcels. Policy makers can approve either plan, or they can reject both plans and have
no solar installation on the parcels.
Please examine the three options below and indicate which option you prefer.
CHOICE A

CHOICE B

20 acres
(generates enough
power for 640
homes)

30 acres
(generates enough
power for 960
homes)

Visibility

Partially visible

Not Visible

Setback

100 ft

200 ft

$10 increase
($120 annual ↑)

$15 increase
($180 annual ↑)

No change

A

B

C







Size of
installation

Change in
monthly
electricity bill
(annual)
YOUR
CHOICE
[Please check
ONE box only]
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CHOICE C

NO SOLAR
PANELS

60
40
0

20

Percent

80

100

Figure A4: Alternative choice by land use

Forest

Farm

Commercial

Solar

Brownfield

Status quo

Notes: N = 1,298 for forest, 1,305 for Farm, 652 for commercial, and 653 for brownfield.
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Figure A5: Importance of attributes while making choices

Some
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Not at all

Table A1: Attribute coefficients estimated separately by land types
Farm and Forest
Commercial and Brownfield
Variable
(1)
(2)
Acres
0.003
0.024***
(0.003)
(0.004)
PartVisibility
-0.130*
0.018
(0.077)
(0.111)
FullVisibility
-0.397***
-0.280**
(0.098)
(0.113)
Setback (00's ft)
0.007
0.086*
(0.041)
(0.050)
Probability
-0.008***
(0.002)
Cost ($/month)
-0.038***
-0.063***
(0.002)
(0.005)
Interactions
Farm × ASC
0.476***
(0.138)
Forest × ASC
1.244***
(0.136)
Brownfield × ASC
-0.501***
(0.167)
Commercial × ASC
-0.767***
(0.169)
Observations
7,809
3,915
AIC
4915.889
2421.016
BIC
4971.593
2464.924
Note: All estimates are derived from conditional logit regressions. Acres refers to the size of the
solar installation in acres. PartVisibility and FullVisibility are dummy variables = 1 if a solar
installation is partially or completely visible, respectively. ASC is the status-quo alternativespecific constant, or a dummy variable = 1 for the status-quo choice and 0 otherwise. Cost is in
terms of USD per household per month. Sample weights are applied and constructed using
stepwise adjustment on three variables: age, political affiliation, and rural/urban residence.
Standard errors, clustered by respondent, are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the
90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table A2: Attribute coefficients from logit regressions for basic
specification without prior-land-use-specific ASC
Conditional Heteroscedastic Random parameters logit
Variable
Logit
Logit
Mean
SD
Acres
0.010***
0.024***
0.012***
0.020***
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.004)
PartVisibility
-0.046
-0.029
-0.081
0.004
(0.060)
(0.105)
(0.067)
(0.068)
FullVisibility
-0.276***
-0.418***
-0.372***
0.428**
(0.070)
(0.117)
(0.085)
(0.200)
Setback (00's ft)
-0.026
0.032
-0.031
0.184*
(0.030)
(0.050)
(0.039)
(0.105)
Probability
0.016***
0.061***
0.024***
0.046***
(0.002)
(0.013)
(0.003)
(0.008)
ASC
0.053
-0.434**
-0.236**
1.274***
(0.096)
(0.153)
(0.119)
(0.121)
Cost ($/month)
-0.033***
-0.071***
-0.039***
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.003)
Heteroskedastic
variables
Farm
-1.063***
(0.206)
Forest
-1.263***
(0.153)
Commercial
-0.005
(0.130)
Choices
11,724
11,724
11,724
Respondents
656
656
656
AIC
7967.51
7880.30
7468.17
BIC
8019.10
7954.00
7563.97
Note: Acres refers to the size of the solar installation in acres. Part visibility and Full visibility are
dummy variables = 1 if a solar installation is partially or completely visible, respectively. ASC is
the status-quo alternative-specific constant, or a dummy variable = 1 for the status-quo choice and 0
otherwise. Cost is in terms of USD per person per month. Standard errors, clustered by respondent,
are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.

96

Table A3: Welfare estimates for solar attributes without prior-land-usespecific ASC
Conditional
Heteroskedastic
Random
Attribute
logit
logit
parameters logit
Acres
$0.30***
$0.34***
$0.29***
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.06)
PartVisibility
-$1.42
-$0.41
-$2.05
(1.85)
(1.59)
(1.70)
FullVisibility
-$8.47***
-$5.92***
-$9.46***
(2.21)
(1.79)
(2.12)
Setback (00's ft)
-$0.80
$0.45
-$0.78
(0.89)
(0.67)
(0.91)
Probability
$0.50***
$0.87***
$0.60***
(0.06)
(0.24)
(0.09)
Total WTP
-$8.29***
$4.27
-$1.43
(2.75)
(6.45)
(2.81)
Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per person per month. The total WTP estimates
assume a 10 acre, fully visible installation with a setback of 150 feet, and a 0% probability
of development in the future. Standard errors, calculated using the bootstrap method (1000
replications) , are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99%
level, respectively.
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Table A4: Developing solar siting incentives justified by residents’ preferences, 6 MW array
Aggregate WTP/kWh
Household Household
Median
Median
Median
WTP
WTP/kWh
Policy Action
households
households
households
within 0.5 miles within 1 mile
within 3 miles
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Forest to Commercial
$68.36
$0.00029
$0.03
$0.09
$0.82
Forest to Brownfield
$63.95
$0.00027
$0.03
$0.09
$0.77
Farm to Commercial
$32.54
$0.00014
$0.01
$0.04
$0.39
Farm to Brownfield
$28.13
$0.00012
$0.01
$0.04
$0.34
Fully visible to partly visible
$6.47
$0.00003
$0.002
$0.01
$0.08
Fully visible to not visible
$8.43
$0.00004
$0.003
$0.01
$0.10
98

Notes: Household WTP values in Column 1 are derived from Column 3 of Table 5. The WTP for switching solar development from
one land type to another is calculated by subtracting the total WTP for the former land type from the latter. The WTP for converting a
fully visible installation into a partly visible one is obtained by subtracting the WTP for a partly visible installation from the WTP for a
fully visible installation, and then changing the sign from negative to positive. The WTP for making a fully visible installation not
visible at all is the negative of the marginal WTP estimate of 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. Column 2 values are calculated by dividing Column 1 by
expected monthly electricity generation from a 6 MW installation. Columns 3, 4, and 5 take the household WTP/kwh values from
Column 2 and aggregate them over the median number of households within a radius of 0.5, 1, 3 miles respectively. Based on
population density from the 2010 RI Census, we calculate the median number of households within an area equivalent to 0.5 miles
from a solar array is 239, within 1 mile is 955, and within 3 miles is 8,599.
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ABSTRACT
This study estimates and compares willingness to pay values from a choice experiment
regarding utility-scale solar energy between two groups: a traditional, random sample
derived using best practices and a sample of engaged individuals who attended an
informational meeting about solar energy. Our results suggest that the preferences of
engaged and random sample respondents align in sign for a majority of attributes.
However, there are large differences in willingness to pay magnitudes, with engaged
respondents willing to pay two to four times more than random sample respondents.
We advise caution while generalizing valuation estimates derived from convenience
samples, though the overall preferences can still provide insights of the broader
population.
Keywords: Convenience sample; Contingent valuation; Utility-scale solar; Willingness
to pay
JEL codes: C83; Q24; Q42; Q51
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by one policy question and a related academic
question. Important local policy decisions about school funding, land development,
and budget priorities are often decided by city or town councils, with input from
school committees, zoning boards, and similar. In addition, these councils and
committees hold public meetings, in which residents can attend and speak their
opinions on issues under consideration. In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville
viewed township democracy as a particularly strong pillar of the American
experiment. However, at least in its modern incarnation, only a select few residents
show up and speak at town meetings, and often they are the most zealous for a given
issue. This raises the concern that local decisions are made with input from people
whose preferences are not representative. This paper investigates how preferences for
an engaged group of residents differ from a representative sample, and in turn how
following policy prescriptions from those who show up to meetings may lead to policy
that does not reflect the whole town.
The academic motivation for this paper is assessing how convenience sampling
may yield biased results when seeking to estimate population preferences. Random
sampling is the gold standard of collecting data, but it can often be costly and
cumbersome to collect such a sample. In contrast, convenience sampling is cheaper
and easier, but it is unclear to what extent inferences drawn from that kind of sample
are generalizable. To this end, we investigate differences in preferences and
willingness to pay (WTP) values between a random sample and a convenience sample
comprised of engaged stakeholders.
We design a choice experiment (CE) survey to elicit WTP values for solar
siting attributes in the state of Rhode Island. Four solar siting attributes are considered:
installation size, visibility, setback distance, and current land use of the proposed
development site. To recruit highly engaged stakeholders, a webinar titled “Valuing
Siting Options for Solar Energy in RI” was organized by the University of Rhode
Island and advertised on social media. The content of the webinar discussed the trends
in solar development and presented an overview of research plans, but no findings or
opinions were given. Following the webinar, the survey was disseminated to the list of
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104 people who had registered for the seminar. Of those, 45 people returned complete
responses and form our engaged sample. In addition, a random sample of 3000
individuals were drawn from the 2019 Rhode Island voter registration database and
invited to take the survey. Of those, 656 completed our survey and form our random
sample of respondents.
Our results indicate that the engaged and the random sample respondents’
preferences lie in the same direction for the most part (in that they like and dislike the
same set of attributes) but differ in magnitude. As a result, large differences exist in
some of their respective WTP values. Both groups of respondents like large
installations, and the engaged sample willing to pay almost twice as much (between
$12 and $17.40 per month) for the same. To avoid visual disamenities from solar
installations, respondents in the random sample are willing to pay between $6.21 and
$8.43 per month, and engaged respondents are willing to pay three times more than
that, between $22.12 and $27.28 per month. While random sample respondents are
mainly unaffected by setback distance, the engaged sample care much more about it.
Our results also indicate that when the probability of future residential development on
farmland and forest increases, random sample respondents are less likely to choose the
status quo option. In contrast, engaged respondents are not affected at all by future
residential development on farms and forests. The random sample respondents are also
less sensitive to changes in their utility bill.
We find that both groups dislike having farms and forests converted into solar
installations. Engaged respondents are willing to pay between $82.08 and $198.50 per
month for avoiding solar development on forest lands, which is two to four times more
than the random sample’s monthly WTP (between $40.58 and $49.49). Random
sample respondents are in support of developing commercial and brownfield sites into
solar, with a total WTP value between $14.31 and $20.72 per month for solar
development on commercial land, and between $9.97 and $15.07 for brownfield
development. Engaged respondents are similarly in favor of converting commercial
and brownfield lands into solar but are willing to pay over three times more for
commercial development, between $43.71 and $73.88 per month, and over two times
more for brownfield development, between $18.90 and $57.73.
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We contribute to the environmental economics literature that examines the
differences between a random and a conveniently obtained (non-random) sample.
Systematic comparisons of results drawn from random and convenience samples are
often found in medical literatures (Hedt and Pagano, 2011; Hultsch et al., 2002;
Jannink et al., 1995; Özdemir et al., 2011), but its application in environmental
economics is less common. We are aware of only one study by Whitehead (1991) that
analyzes the differences between a random and a non-random sample in the context of
environmental valuation. He uses a dichotomous choice contingent valuation (CV)
method to elicit WTP values for wetland protection in Kentucky from a random
sample of individuals drawn from telephone directories and a sample of ‘interest
group’ members of the Buckley Hills Audubon Society (BHAS). Comparing WTP
values between the two, he finds that the BHAS sample’s WTP is over eight times
larger than the random sample, which indicates the potential magnitude of selfselection bias. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compare WTP values
between a random and non-random sample using a CE framework. Similar to
Whitehead (1991), our study also finds that the engaged group has higher WTP values
for almost all solar attributes, though the magnitude of the difference is smaller.
Our study also contributes to the literature examining self-selection in CV
studies. This issue is frequently studied in environmental economics, as individuals
with high environmental values are more likely to respond to a survey which biases
estimated WTP values upwards (Bowker and Stoll, 1988; Edwards and Anderson,
1987; Loomis, 1987; Mitchell and Carson, 2013; Walsh et al., 1984). Whitehead
(1991) finds that on average, the interest group sample is more educated, has a higher
income, has more children and has a higher percentage of male respondents compared
to the general (random) sample. However, both samples are similar in age. Our
findings are mostly similar: the engaged sample is more educated and has more
children compared to the random sample, and age is not statistically different between
the two samples. Contrary to the findings of Whitehead (1991), we find that on
average, our engaged sample has a lower household income and has a higher
percentage of female respondents compared to the random sample, though these
differences are not statistically significant.
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Lastly, our findings yield insights into potential distortions that can be driven
into the local policy process by the practice of holding public meetings and the reality
that only the loudest voices show up. NIMBY concerns are central to many local land
use issues, including renewable energy siting, and our findings suggest that those
concerns may be realized or exacerbated when a town council only hears from the
engaged population. Jarvis (2021) documents the significant costs of listening to
loudest voices in the context of renewable energy siting in the United Kingdom.
Specifically, he estimates that the cost of deploying wind projects in the UK increased
between 12% – 36% when local officials’ refusal to build new renewable energy
projects moved development on to less optimal sites.
2 BACKGROUND
The setting of our study is in the state of Rhode Island (RI) where the siting of
solar installations has become contentious in recent years (Kuffner, 2018). RI has
established a goal of generating 38.5% of statewide energy from renewable sources by
2035, which has brought roughly 400 acres of land in the state under utility-scale solar
development (EIA, 2021). Utility-scale solar arrays (sized 1 MW and above) require
ten times more land per installed capacity compared to conventional sources, which
has raised concerns about land use change in recent years (Denholm and Margolis,
2008; Ong et al., 2013; Trainor et al., 2016). This is especially pronounced in RI, the
smallest state in the country, where the construction of utility-scale solar installations
puts immense pressure on its already scarce land resources. Additionally, RI is the
second most densely populated state in the country, and several installations are built
in residential areas with people living in the immediate vicinity of the arrays, which
leads to a decline in property prices (Gaur and Lang, 2020).
The solar siting debate in RI is most noticeable at town council and zoning
board meetings where solar development plans are proposed, debated, and eventually
approved or denied. The largest source of contention is the common practice of siting
utility-scale solar on forest and farmlands. While these are the areas where
development is cheapest, they offer many amenities to residents. Environmental
groups have come down both in support of and opposed to solar expansion due to the
difficult tradeoffs of addressing climate change but maintaining ecosystem services
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and local food production.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3 outlines the design of
our choice experiment and describes the empirical models used in our analysis.
Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 5 details the
results of our analysis and section 6 provides concluding remarks.
3 METHODS
In this study we use the stated preference (SP) survey methodology for
eliciting individuals’ preferences and estimating their WTP for various attributes of
utility-scale solar installations. Within the SP context, we employ a CE that is
developed using a d-efficient design in Stata.
3.1 Choice experiment design
The purpose of the survey is to quantify the perceived externalities from
utility-scale solar installations by estimating the tradeoffs people are willing to make
for a set of siting attributes. Choice tasks are modelled as solar development plans on
four different kinds of land types: farm, forest, commercial, and brownfield (Lang et
al., 2021). Each respondent is presented with six choice tasks, two each for farm and
forest land types and one each for commercial and brownfield. Within each plan, the
respondent is presented with three hypothetical alternatives: A, B, and C. Alternatives
A and B describe a solar installation with several attributes that will be developed on
the land type under consideration. Alternative C is a status quo option with no solar
development that will leave the land in its current state.
All development plans present four solar attributes: size of installation (area of
land in acres and number of households powered), visibility (whether the installation is
fully visible, partly visible, or not at all visible), setback (minimum distance of the
solar panels from the property line), and change in electricity bill (in monthly and
annual terms). An additional attribute probability of residential development is
included when the land type is either farmland or forest to account for the future
possibility of undeveloped land being converted into residential housing.
Our survey includes four sections. Section 1 provides information on the
history of solar development in Rhode Island and the aims and objectives of our study.
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Section 2 includes questions about the respondents’ use of energy and their attitudes
towards various energy sources. In Section 3, we first familiarize the respondents with
our CE design, describing all the attributes included in its framework, and then present
the six choice sets in a randomized order. The final section gathers information about
respondents’ perceived consequentiality of the survey, the importance of each attribute
in their decision-making, and respondents’ demographic characteristics.
3.2 Empirical models
We draw on Random Utility framework (Manski, 1977; McFadden, 1974)
where the utility that respondent 𝑖 derives from alternative 𝑚 can be broken into an
observable and an unobservable (random) component. This can be expressed as:
(1)

𝑈𝑖𝑚 = 𝑉𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚
where 𝑈𝑖𝑚 is the total utility that is a function of observable utility 𝑉𝑖𝑚 and random
utility 𝜀𝑖𝑚 .
We model respondents’ choices using three different methods. First, we use
McFadden's (1974) multinomial (conditional) logit (CL) model that assumes
preference homogeneity and a homoscedastic error structure. The probability of
individual 𝑖 choosing alternative 𝑚 can be expressed as:
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑉𝑖𝑚 )

(2)

𝑃𝑖𝑚 = ∑𝑁

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑉𝑖𝑛 )

Where the positive scale factor 𝜆 (inversely proportional to the error variance, 𝜎𝜀2 ) is
constant and normalized to unity.
Our second model of choice is the heteroskedastic conditional logit (HCL)
(DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Hensher et al., 1998), which relaxes the CL model’s
assumption of a homoscedastic error structure by allowing error variances to and scale
parameters to vary across individuals and choices. In this model, the scale parameters
are represented as a function of 𝒁𝒊𝒎 , a vector of individual- and choice-specific
characteristics, and 𝜑, a parameter describing the effect of those characteristics on
error variance:
(3)

𝜆𝑖𝑚 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝝋𝒁𝒊𝒎 )

The probability of individual 𝑖 choosing alternative 𝑚 can therefore be expressed as:
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𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑖𝑚 𝑽𝒊𝒎 )

(4)

𝑃𝑖𝑚 = ∑𝑀

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑖𝑚 𝑽𝒊𝒏 )

Our third and final model is the random parameters (mixed) logit (RPL) model
that further relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) restriction of the
CL model and additionally allows for preference heterogeneity. In this model, the
utility derived by individual 𝑖 from alternative 𝑚 in situation 𝑡 is:
𝑈𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 (𝜷 + 𝜼𝒊 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑚 = 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 (𝜷𝒊 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑚

(5)

where 𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 represents observed attributes, 𝜷 is a vector of coefficients associated with
those attributes, and 𝜼𝒊 is a vector of standard deviation parameters that captures
preference heterogeneity. Preference heterogeneity is captured directly in the RPL
model through the vector 𝜷𝒊 , which represents how much an individual 𝑖 deviates
from the population mean. The probability of individual 𝑖′𝑠 sequence of choices
[𝑐1 , 𝑐2 , … . 𝑐𝑇 ] is described by:
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝒊𝒎𝒕 𝜷𝒊 )

𝑃𝑖[𝑐1 ,𝑐2 ,…𝑐𝑇 ] = ∫ … ∫ ∏𝑇𝑡 [∑𝑀

𝑛=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝒊𝒏𝒕𝜷𝒊 )

] 𝑓 (𝜷)𝑑𝜷

(6)

2.3 Estimation
Our main expected utility specification is given as:
𝐾
𝑉𝑖𝑚 = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 (𝑋𝑘 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑) + ∑𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 (𝑋𝑘 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)

(7)

where 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑚 and 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑚 are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent
belongs to the random or the engaged sample, respectively. 𝑋𝑘 is a set of the following
attributes and interaction terms: 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚 , 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 , 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 ,
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑚 , 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 , 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚 , 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 , 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 ,
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 . 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚 refers to the size of the
installation (in acres), 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 and 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 are dummy variables
equal to 1 if the installation is partly visible or completely visible, respectively,
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑚 is to the setback distance (in 00’s feet), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑚 is the likelihood of
future solar development on farm and forest land, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚 is the change in
respondents’ monthly electricity bill, and 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 is the status-quo alternative-specific
constant which is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the status-quo choice and equal
to 0 for either of the solar development options (Choices A and B). 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 , 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 ,
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 are all dummy variables equal to 1 if the choice set
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is framed around the respective land use.
In Equation (7), each solar attribute 𝑘 is associated with a preference
coefficient 𝛽𝑘𝑠 , where 𝑠 represents whether the respondent belongs to the random or
the engaged sample. A positive sign on 𝛽𝑘𝑠 indicates that respondents in sample 𝑠
prefer the associated attribute associated with it, while a negative sign signals a dislike
for it. The interaction of the 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 term with a land use type 𝑙 and sample 𝑠 represents
the respective sample’s preferences for developing solar arrays on the land use type 𝑙.
If the coefficient associated with the triple interaction between land use type 𝑙, the
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑚 term, and sample𝑠 is positive, it implies that the respondents in that sample
prefer the status-quo option over the other alternatives and that they dislike having
solar arrays on the associated land parcel. All coefficients are calculated using
maximum likelihood procedures.
We obtain each sample’s MWTP for attribute 𝑘 by dividing the coefficient of
that attribute with the negative of the cost coefficient associated with the respective
group, 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 :
𝛽𝑘𝑠

(8)

𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 = − 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠

Sample 𝑠’s maximum WTP (or compensating variation) for a specified plan can be
estimated by finding the price that makes the utility derived by the respondents in that
sample from that particular plan, denoted as 𝑉𝑖1𝑠 , equal to the utility they derive from
the status quo option, denoted 𝑉𝑖𝑆𝑄𝑠_𝑙 . Therefore, the compensating variation (CV) for
each land use type 𝑙 can be expressed as:
𝐶𝑉𝑙 =

𝑉 𝑆𝑄𝑠_𝑙− 𝑉 1𝑠∗

(9)

𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠

where 𝑉 1𝑠∗ is the utility of the non-price attributes associated with the solar
development plan under consideration, for sample 𝑠. Subtracting the CV associated
with one land use type from another gives us the premium the average respondent
would pay for switching solar panels from one to the other.
4 DATA
4.1 Survey implementation
For the engaged sample, we recruited participants through an online invitation
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to attend a webinar on August 14, 2020 titled “Valuing Siting Options for Solar Energy
in Rhode Island.” The webinar was advertised by the University of Rhode Island’s
Cooperative Extension program on social media (Facebook and Instagram) and
through email blasts using the Cooperative Extension email database and the Rhode
Island Office of Energy Resources (RIOER) database. The webinar introduced the
attendees to our study, along with its aims and objectives. The attendees were also
informed that they would be receiving an email invitation to take our survey online the
following day.
The survey was disseminated to the engaged sample in two rounds. On August
15, 2020, 104 individuals that had registered for our webinar were emailed a one-time,
non-shareable link to our online survey. The link was emailed to all registrants, and
not just to those who had attended. One week later, a reminder email was sent out to
those registrants who had not responded.
For the random sample, we used best practices as outlined by Dillman et al.
(2014) to design a mixed-mode, web-push survey (Lang et al., 2021). The mixedmode aspect allows us to collect data both online (using Qualtrics) and on paper.
We used the 2019 Rhode Island voter registration database (publicly available
from the Secretary of State) to draw a random sample of 3,000 individuals residing in
RI. These data include name, address, age, party affiliation, and whether the individual
participated in the last eight elections held. We adjusted sample selection probabilities
to increase the odds of selecting younger people, those living in rural areas, and
Republicans. We oversampled younger residents because we anticipated lower
response rates from them. We also oversampled rural residents because this subgroup
is more likely to be impacted by solar siting decisions. Finally, we elected to
oversample Republicans because they comprise a smaller subset of the population in
Rhode Island and have been found to be less responsive to surveys (Best and Krueger,
2012; Pearson-Merkowitz and Lang, 2020).
The survey was disseminated to the random sample in three rounds. The first
round was mailed on September 4, 2020. Each envelope included an introductory
letter that provided a link and unique access code to the online survey, and a $2 cash
incentive. Two weeks later, non-respondents were sent a follow-up postcard as a
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reminder, which also gave the link and access code. In the third and final round
(mailed two weeks after the second round), subjects who had not responded to either
of the first two rounds of mailings were sent a paper survey.
Of the 104 webinar registrants, 48 attended the webinar, 30 of which
responded to our survey. 20 non-attendee registrants also took the survey, giving us a
total response rate of 48% for the engaged sample. Of the 2,796 surveys that were
delivered to the random sample, we received 669 total responses (24% response rate).
510 were collected from the online mode and 159 were received by mail. We dropped
18 individuals who did not answer any of the choice questions (13 from the random
sample and 5 from the engaged sample). Our final, pooled sample consists of 12,534
survey choices made by 701 individuals.
4.2 Summary statistics
To make our random sample representative of the RI population, we use state
voter registration data to construct sample weights. Three key demographic variables
also inform the construction of the weights: age, political affiliation, and rural/urban
residence.23 All engaged sample respondents were given a weight equal to 1, which is
the average weight given to respondents in our weighted random sample.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 report the means
and standard deviations for the (weighted) random and engaged samples, respectively.
Column 3 presents the difference in means between the random and engaged samples,
along with standard errors. Most characteristics are well-balanced between the groups.
The largest differences lie in educational attainment and political affiliation. Over 90%
of the engaged sample respondents have a college degree or higher, compared to 69%
from the random sample. This is in line with Whitehead (1991) who finds that the
interest group members have a higher level of education compared to the general
sample. Only 4% of our engaged sample respondents are Republicans, compared to
14% in the random sample. On average, the engaged sample has fewer children living
at home and a lower electricity bill, with the differences being statistically significant

23

Table A1 in the online appendix reports the demographic distribution for these three variables in our
unweighted, non-engaged sample, the population, and the weighted, non-engaged sample.
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at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The two samples also differ in their attitudes towards different energy sources.
While both groups have a positive attitude towards renewable energy sources (solar,
wind, and hydro), the engaged sample displayed an extremely positive attitude. Every
respondent in the engaged sample had a positive or very positive attitude towards
solar, and their attitude towards onshore wind was slightly more positive compared to
the non-engaged sample. The engaged sample also displayed a negative attitude
towards natural gas, compared to the non-engaged sample, which was more neutral.
Though both groups dislike nuclear energy sources, the engaged respondents are
slightly more supportive of it on average. Both groups strongly dislike energy
production from coal.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Main results
Table 2 presents results obtained from logistic regressions estimating Equation
(8). Column 1 reports coefficients from the CL model. Column 2 shows coefficients
derived from estimating the HCL model, along with scale parameters associated with
farm, forest, and commercial land use types.24 Column 3 reports coefficients from the
RPL model, while Column 4 presents standard deviations from the same model.
Results are broadly consistent across columns. We find that the coefficient on
𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, which
demonstrates that respondents in the random sample prefer large solar installations.
The coefficient on 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 is also positive across the board, suggesting
that engaged respondents also like large installations, though the coefficient it is only
significant (at the 1% level) in the HCL model. This is likely because the small sample
size of the engaged respondents precludes us from identifying effects that are small in
magnitude. In addition, Figure A1 in the online appendix illustrates that installation
size matters more to the engaged respondents than to the respondents in the random
24

The indicator variable 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 is excluded from the list of scale parameters because it is not
possible to include it along with interactions for each attribute. We also estimate alternative models
(results not presented) that do not use the full set of attribute interactions but include 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 in the
scale parameter, and do not find statistically different scale values for the engaged sample compared to
the nonengaged sample.
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sample. A greater percentage of engaged respondents reported that installation size
was of “a lot” or “some” importance, and fewer reported that it was “not at all”
important compared to non-engaged respondents.
The interaction coefficients P𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 display a negative sign, though it is not statistically significant in any of the
models. In contrast, the interactions of both groups with 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 are negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. This implies that
fully visible installations elicit a more negative response compared to partly visible
installations from engaged and randomly selected respondents alike.
The coefficient on 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 is positive for both groups and across all models,
though there is some variation in significance. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is weakly
significant (at the 10% level) in the RPL model and insignificant in the CL and HCL
models, and small in magnitude throughout. In contrast, the coefficient on
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 is larger in magnitude, significant in the CL (at the 10% level)
and HCL (at the 5% level) models, and insignificant in the RCL model. This provides
suggestive evidence that both groups of respondents are slightly affected by setback
distance. Additionally, the standard deviation in the RCL model associated with the
attribute is significant for the random sample but not for the engaged sample,
suggesting that preferences for setback distance are more homogeneous in the engaged
sample.
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is negative and significant at the 1% level across all
models, which implies that as the probability of future residential development on
farms and forests increases, randomly selected respondents are less likely to choose
the status quo option. Contrastingly, engaged respondents are unaffected by the
probability of development in the future, as suggested by the insignificant coefficient
on 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 in all models. This can also be seen in Figure A1, which
depicts that almost 40% of the engaged sample respondents reported that they were
“not at all” affected by future probability of development. The coefficients on
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 are consistently negative and significant at
the 1% level, signifying that both groups dislike having a higher electric bill, which is
a standard finding. More interesting, however, is that the cost coefficients associated
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with the engaged sample are lower in magnitude and statistically significantly
different (at the 10% level) compared to the random sample, implying that the
engaged respondents are less affected by higher costs. This can also be seen in Figure
A1 where almost 36% of engaged respondents report 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 to be “not at all” important,
compared to only 18% of the respondents in the random sample.
We find that both groups of respondents have almost similar preferences
regarding the land type on which solar is developed. The interaction term
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 is positive in all models, and for both the engaged and random samples,
indicating respondents’ dislike for having farmlands converted for solar development.
However, the significance is not consistent. The coefficient is significant at the 1%
level in the CL and HCL models and at the 10% level in the RPL model for the
random sample. For the engaged sample, it is weakly significant (at the 10% level)
only in the HCL model. The coefficients on 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 are positive and strongly
significant across all models and for both groups. This indicates that both random and
engaged respondents dislike solar development on forest lands. The coefficients on
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚are negative and significant (at the 1% level)
throughout, signifying the random sample respondents’ preference for siting solar
installations on brownfields. The 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 coefficients are
also negative, though there are inconsistencies in significance. It is significant at the
1% level in the CL model and at the 5% level in the HCL model, but insignificant in
the RPL model. Overall, it provides some evidence suggesting that engaged sample
respondents also like having solar installations built on brownfield lands. The
coefficients on 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝐴𝑆𝐶 are negative and significant in all models and for
both groups, indicating that commercial sites are strongly and universally preferred for
solar development.
Panel A of Table 3 reports MWTP estimates for all solar attributes for both
groups, along with standard errors derived using the delta method. We find that
randomly selected respondents have a monthly WTP between $0.24 and $0.28 for
each additional acre of land to be developed for solar. The engaged sample
respondents are willing to pay almost twice that, with WTP values ranging between
$0.40 and $0.58 per month. The corresponding monthly WTP values for a 30 acre

113

installation range between $7.20 and $8.40 for the random sample and between $12
and $17.40 for the engaged sample respondents. This is consistent with the engaged
sample respondents’ highly positive attitudes towards solar energy.
The MWTP for a partly visible installation is negative, insignificant, and small
in magnitude for respondents in the random sample. The engaged sample respondents
are willing to pay five to six times more to avoid visual disamenities from partly
visible installations, though the value is only weakly significant (at the 10% level) in
the RPL model. We find that both groups have a higher negative monthly MWTP for a
fully visible installation compared to a partly visible one, and all estimates are
significant at the 1% level. Additionally, the engaged sample’s values are higher by a
factor of almost three. On average, randomly sample respondents are willing to pay
between $6.21 and $8.43 per month and engaged respondents between $22.12 and
$27.28 per month to avoid seeing solar installations that are completely visible. This
difference in WTP values is statistically significant at the 10% level in the CL and
RPL models and at the 5% level in the HCL model.
The MWTP for 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 is small for the random sample, ranging between
$0.98 and $1.19 per month, and significant in the RPL model only. For the engaged
sample, the MWTP for additional setback distance is larger, and ranges between $4.05
and $5.83 per month, suggesting that they care much more about setback than
respondents in the random sample. The values for the 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 attribute are
negative and significant for the random sample, indicating that when the probability of
future residential development increases, they require less compensation for the
conversion of farms and forests into solar installations. The corresponding estimates
for the engaged sample respondents are insignificant across all models, and very small
in magnitude in the CL and HCL models, suggesting that the engaged respondents are
not as affected as the random sample respondents by future residential development on
farms and in forests.
In Panel B of Table 3, we present CV estimates for solar development on
different land types. We make the assumption of a 10 acre solar installation (median
size of solar installation in RI) that is completely visible, has a setback distance of 150
feet with a 0% probability of future residential development. Our results provide
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suggestive evidence that both engaged and random respondents dislike having solar
installations on farmlands. On average, random sample respondents are willing to pay
between $12.68 and $23.44 per month to avoid solar installations on farms. Engaged
sample respondents are willing to pay between $17.40 and $36.53 for the same. The
monthly WTP to avoid solar development on forests is large for both groups of
respondents, and the estimate is significant at the 1% level across models. We find that
random sample respondents are willing to pay between $40.58 and $49.49 per month
for avoiding solar development on forested land. Engaged sample respondents are
willing to pay even higher amounts, between $82.08 and $198.50 per month,
indicating a very strong aversion to having forests converted into solar installations.
Both groups support developing commercial sites into solar, with respondents
in the random sample willing to pay between $14.31 and $20.72 per month and
engaged respondents about three times as much – between $43.71 and $73.88 per
month to have solar installations built on commercial land. We also find positive WTP
values for 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 for the random sample, indicating that they prefer having solar
installations on brownfields with a monthly WTP between $9.97 and $15.07. For the
engaged group, the WTP value for solar development on brownfields is larger and
positive, ranging between $18.90 and $57.73, although it is significant in the CL
model only. The large differences in the WTP and CV magnitudes between the
engaged and random samples could partly be driven by the small cost coefficients
associated with the engaged respondents. Since the engaged sample has larger
coefficients associated with most solar attributes (compared to the non-engaged
sample), the combination of a large numerator and a small denominator leads to very
small WTP and CV values.
5.2 Robustness check with online-only responses
We conduct a robustness analysis by dropping 148 respondents from the
random sample who had responded by mail. This eliminates any variation in responses
that could be caused due to differences in survey mode. We generate new survey
weights for the smaller random sample of 508 online respondents and assign a weight
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equal to 1 to the engaged respondents.25 The final sample consists of 9,933 choices
made by 553 respondents.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the MWTP values for all solar siting attributes for
both samples.26 Overall, the results from the online-only sample are qualitatively
similar to our main results. Respondents from both samples like larger installations,
but engaged respondents are willing to pay almost two times more than random
sample respondents for each additional acre of solar development. Assuming a 30 acre
installation, random sample respondents have a monthly MWTP between $8.10 and
$9.60, while engaged respondents have a monthly MWTP between $12 and $18.
Negative MWTP values for 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 indicate that both sets of respondents
dislike partly visible installations, though the coefficient is significant only for the
random sample in the RPL model. In line with our main results, engaged respondents
are willing to pay two to four times more per month than random sample respondents
to avoid seeing fully visible installations. This value ranges between -$6.52 and -$8.40
per month for random sample respondents and between -$20.72 and -$27.28 for
engaged respondents. Engaged respondents care more about setback distance
compared to random sample respondents and are willing to pay between $4.92 and
$5.86 per month for increased setback distance. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is negative
and significant in all models at the 1% level, indicating that random sample
respondents are willing to pay between $5 and $12 per month for a 25% reduction in
the probability of future residential development. However, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑
is insignificant throughout, which implies that engaged respondents are unaffected by
probability of residential development on farms and forest lands, a finding that is
similar to our main results.
We calculate CV values for solar development on various land types and
present the estimates in Panel B of Table 4. As with our main results, we assume a 10
acre, fully visible installation, with a 150 feet setback distance and a 0% probability of
future residential development. Our results are consistent with the results of the main
25

Survey weights are generated using the same procedure that is described in Section 4.2.
The logistic regression coefficients that are used to estimate CV values in Table 4 are presented in
Table A1 of the online appendix.
26

116

model. Respondents from both samples dislike solar development on farmlands, with
the random sample respondents willing to pay between $17.11 and $25.13 per month
and the engaged respondents willing to pay around $36 to avoid converting farms into
solar installations. We find that respondents from both samples have a high WTP to
avoid solar development on forested lands, but engaged respondents are willing to pay
two to three times more than random sample respondents. The upper bound in the
difference between WTP values is slightly less compared to our main results, where
engaged respondents are willing to pay up to four times more to avoid solar
development on forested lands. On average, the monthly WTP to avoid solar
development in forests ranges between $42.59 and $54.29 for random sample
respondents and between $82.08 and $157.98 for the engaged respondents.
We find positive WTP values for solar development on 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 for
respondents from both groups, with random sample respondents willing to pay
between $12.75 and $19.90 per month and engaged respondents between $40.80 and
$196.30 per month (three times higher in the CL and HCL models and ten times
higher in the RPL model) to have solar installations built on commercial land. This
difference in WTP values is much higher than in our main results, where engaged
respondents are willing to pay only three times as much as random respondents for
solar development on commercial sites. Our results indicate that both random sample
respondents and engaged respondents support solar development on brownfields. On
average, respondents from the random sample are willing to pay between $9.82 and
$15.45 for building solar installations on brownfields. As with our main results,
engaged respondents are willing to pay almost two times more for the same, between
$18.50 and $38.04 per month, though the estimate is significant (at the 10% level) in
the CL and RPL models only.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes differences between a random sample and a conveniently
obtained sample of engaged respondents. Engaged respondents were recruited from a
registration list of 104 individuals that had signed up for a webinar on “Valuing Siting
Options for Solar Energy in RI”. The random sample is comprised of respondents to a
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survey that was distributed to 2,794 randomly selected RI residents. Our final sample
includes 45 engaged and 656 randomly selected respondents. We elicit residents’
preferences for the following solar energy siting attributes: installation size, visibility,
setback distance, probability of future residential development, change in electricity
bill, and current land use of the proposed solar site. WTP values are estimated using
the CE design and logistic regression models.
Our results indicate that while both groups of respondents have similar
preferences, there are differences in their MWTP for several attributes. Both engaged
and random sample respondents prefer larger installations, but the engaged sample is
willing to pay between $12 and $17.40 per month for a 30 acre installation, which is
two times more than what the respondents in the random sample are willing to pay.
Engaged respondents’ monthly MWTP to avoid visual disamenities from fully visible
installations is between $22.12 and $27.28, which is three times more than the random
sample respondents’ values (between $6.21 and $8.43). Respondents in the random
sample are mainly unaffected by setback distance, but the engaged respondents care
much more about it and are willing to pay between $4.05 and $5.83 per month for
increased setback distance. Random sample respondents are less likely to choose the
status quo option when the probability of future residential development on farms and
forests increases, but engaged respondents are not affected by it.
We obtain total WTP values for solar development on various land types by
assuming a 10 acre, fully visible installation with a setback distance of 150 feet and
0% probability of future residential development. Both groups equally dislike having
solar installations on farmlands, with a total WTP between $12.68 and $23.44 per
month for the random sample and between $17.40 and $36.53 for the engaged sample.
We find large, negative WTP values for solar development on forests for both
groups, but the magnitude is two to four times larger for the engaged sample. On
average, random sample respondents are willing to pay between $40.58 and $49.49
per month, and engaged respondents are willing to pay between $82.08 and $198.50
per month to avoid solar development on forests. Random sample respondents support
developing commercial land into solar with a total WTP value ranging between $14.31
and $20.72 per month, and engaged respondents are willing to pay between $43.71
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and $73.88 per month for the same, which is over three times more than random
sample respondents’ WTP. Respondents in the random sample also like solar
development on brownfield sites, with a monthly total WTP between $9.97 and
$15.07. Engaged respondents similarly support the conversion of brownfield lands
into solar, with a total WTP between $18.90 and $57.73.
In conclusion, we find that the engaged respondents’ WTP for a majority of
solar siting attributes is several times larger compared to random sample respondents.
However, the direction of preferences is the same for all attributes, indicating that both
groups have similar likes and dislikes overall. Thus, while caution must be exercised
when considering the WTP values of an engaged group of individuals for policy
purposes, inferences about overall preferences can be considered to be fairly
representative of the general population.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable
Household income (000's)
College education (1 = yes)
Children at home (1 = yes)
Female (1 = yes)
Age
Homeowner (1 = yes)
Years of residence
Employed (1 = yes)
Electricity bill ($/month)
Solar panels at home (1 = yes)
Urban (1 = yes)
Suburban (1 = yes)
Democrat (1 = yes)
Republican (1 = yes)
Energy attitudes (1 = positive)
Solar
Offshore wind
Onshore wind
Hydro
Natural gas
Nuclear
Coal

106.75
(51.42)
0.69
(0.46)
0.35
(0.48)
0.53
(0.50)
50.81
(15.31)
0.79
(0.41)
15.04
(6.78)
0.67
(0.47)
120.74
(54.50)
0.05
(0.22)
0.23
(0.42)
0.63
(0.48)
0.38
(0.49)
0.14
(0.35)

99.39
(46.58)
0.91
(0.91)
0.21
(0.41)
0.44
(0.50)
53.02
(16.45)
0.78
(0.42)
14.50
(7.29)
0.67
(0.48)
105.56
(54.93)
0.11
(0.32)
0.20
(0.40)
0.56
(0.50)
0.40
(0.50)
0.04
(0.21)

Difference in
means
(std. error)
-7.36
(7.60)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.14**
(0.07)
-0.08
(0.08)
2.21
(2.56)
-0.01
(0.07)
-0.54
(1.12)
0.00
(0.07)
-15.19*
(8.47)
0.06
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.08
(0.08)
0.02
(0.08)
-0.10***
(0.03)

0.88
(0.33)
0.81
(0.39)
0.76
(0.43)
0.68
(0.47)
0.49
(0.50)
0.24
(0.43)
0.07
(0.25)

1.00
(0.00)
0.87
(0.34)
0.89
(0.32)
0.78
(0.42)
0.29
(0.46)
0.38
(0.49)
0.00
(0.00)

0.12***
(0.01)
0.05
(0.05)
0.13**
(0.05)
0.10
(0.07)
-0.20***
(0.07)
0.14*
(0.07)
-0.07***
(0.01)

Random sample
(std. dev.)

Engaged sample
(std. dev.)

Note: All data come from survey responses. Household income and electricity bill values come from a
multiple choice question that included several ranges. We assign people the middle value of their chosen
range.
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Table 2: Attribute coefficients from logit regressions
Conditional Heteroscedastic
Variable
Logit
logit
Acres × Random
0.010***
0.019***
(0.002)
(0.004)
Acres × Engaged
0.011
0.026***
(0.007)
(0.009)
Part visibility × Random
-0.066
-0.067
(0.061)
(0.086)
Part visibility × Engaged
-0.294
-0.334
(0.198)
(0.262)
Full visibility × Random
-0.313***
-0.408***
(0.074)
(0.103)
Full visibility × Engaged
-0.783***
-1.049***
(0.233)
(0.306)
Setback (00's ft) × Random
0.042
0.066
(0.031)
(0.043)
Setback (00's ft) × Engaged
0.151*
0.262**
(0.089)
(0.126)
Probability × Random
-0.008***
-0.014***
(0.002)
(0.004)
Probability × Engaged
-0.002
-0.003
(0.008)
(0.014)
Cost × Random
-0.043***
-0.066***
(0.002)
(0.007)
Cost × Engaged
-0.029***
-0.045***
(0.008)
(0.012)
Land use interactions
Farm × ASC × Random
0.822***
1.425***
(0.135)
(0.268)
Farm × ASC × Engaged
0.566
1.248*
(0.420)
(0.641)
Forest × ASC × Random
1.596***
3.071***
(0.134)
(0.473)
Forest × ASC × Engaged
1.913***
4.116***
(0.471)
(0.971)
Brownfield × ASC × Random
-0.793***
-0.780***
(0.128)
(0.149)
Brownfield × ASC × Engaged
-1.534***
-1.244**
(0.565)
(0.601)
Commercial × ASC × Random
-1.035***
-1.067***
(0.132)
(0.189)
Commercial × ASC × Engaged
-2.562***
-2.360***
(0.769)
(0.883)
Heteroskedastic variables
Farm
-0.454***
(0.120)
Forest
-0.741***
(0.141)
Commercial
-0.027
(0.135)
Observations
12,534
12,534
AIC
7879.706
7832.115
BIC
8028.430
8003.148

Random Parameters Logit
Mean
SD
0.016***
0.042***
(0.003)
(0.005)
0.024
0.046***
(0.015)
(0.016)
-0.132
0.202
(0.088)
(0.484)
-0.468
0.506
(0.299)
(0.365)
-0.524***
0.750***
(0.109)
(0.203)
-1.084***
0.382
(0.376)
(0.425)
0.077*
0.298***
(0.044)
(0.100)
0.198
0.102
(0.145)
(0.152)
-0.031***
0.087***
(0.008)
(0.014)
-0.024
0.150***
(0.032)
(0.058)
-0.065***
(0.004)
-0.049***
(0.013)
0.571*
(0.331)
0.284
(0.642)
2.946***
(0.409)
9.175**
(3.634)
-1.203***
(0.166)
-3.380
(6.735)
-1.494***
(0.171)
-3.266***
(0.989)

3.688***
(0.582)
0.870
(0.981)
4.058***
(0.752)
11.622
(7.947)
0.114
(0.229)
2.064
(5.886)
0.089
(0.275)
0.409
(0.968)

12,534
7064.510
7347.086

Note: Acres refers to the size of the solar installation in acres. Part visibility and Full visibility are dummy
variables = 1 if a solar installation is partially or completely visible, respectively. ASC is the status-quo
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alternative-specific constant, or a dummy variable = 1 for the status-quo choice and 0 otherwise. Cost is in
terms of USD per person per month. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate
significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Willingness to pay estimates for solar attributes
Conditional
Heteroskedastic
Attribute
logit
logit
Panel A: Marginal WTP
Acres × Random
$0.24***
$0.28***
(0.05)
(0.05)
Acres × Engaged
$0.40
$0.58**
(0.27)
(0.24)
Part visibility × Random
-$1.54
-$1.02
(1.43)
(1.32)
Part visibility × Engaged
-$10.26
-$7.43
(6.45)
(5.57)
Full visibility × Random
-$7.30***
-$6.18***
(1.79)
(1.54)
Full visibility × Engaged
-$27.28***
-$23.34***
(9.81)
(7.82)
Setback (00's ft) × Random
$0.98
$1.01
(0.74)
(0.64)
Setback (00's ft) × Engaged
$5.25*
$5.83**
(3.10)
(2.78)
Probability × Random
-$0.19***
-$0.22***
(0.05)
(0.06)
Probability × Engaged
-$0.08
-$0.06
(0.29)
(0.32)
Panel B: Total WTP
Farm
Random sample
-$22.54***
-$23.44***
(3.08)
(3.13)
Engaged sample
-$35.13**
-$36.53**
(15.92)
(16.34)
Forest
Random sample
-$40.58***
-$48.38***
(3.29)
(4.80)
Engaged sample
-$82.08***
-$100.31***
(22.34)
(27.65)
Commercial
Random sample
$20.72***
$14.31***
(3.13)
(2.36)
Engaged sample
$73.88**
$43.71**
(29.98)
(18.66)
Brownfield
Random sample
$15.07***
$9.97***
(2.93)
(2.30)
Engaged sample
$38.04*
$18.90
(20.04)
(12.16)

Random
parameters logit
$0.25***
(0.05)
$0.48*
(0.27)
-$2.04
(1.36)
-$9.56*
(5.51)
-$8.11***
(1.67)
-$22.12***
(7.95)
$1.19*
(0.69)
$4.05
(2.80)
-$0.48***
(0.12)
-$0.50
(0.65)
-$12.68**
(5.05)
-$17.04
(11.20)
-$49.49***
(6.12)
-$198.50***
(72.84)
$19.30***
(2.75)
$55.43***
(21.47)
$14.80***
(2.64)
$57.73
(129.91)

Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per household per month. Estimates in Panel A represent
marginal WTP values. In Panel B, the estimates represent total WTP values and assume a 10 acre,
fully visible installation with a setback of 150 feet, and a 0% probability of development in the
future. In both panels, standard errors are calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Willingness to pay estimates for solar attributes for online respondents
Conditional
Heteroskedastic
Random
Attribute
logit
logit
parameters logit
Panel A: Marginal WTP
Acres × Random
$0.27***
$0.32***
$0.28***
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Acres × Engaged
$0.40
$0.60**
$0.58**
(0.27)
(0.24)
(0.27)
Part visibility × Random
-$2.36
-$1.70
-$2.93**
(1.66)
(1.52)
(1.45)
Part visibility × Engaged
-$10.26
-$7.39
-$7.82
(6.46)
(5.55)
(5.01)
Full visibility × Random
-$7.78***
-$6.52***
-$8.40***
(1.91)
(1.60)
(1.86)
Full visibility × Engaged
-$27.28***
-$23.09***
-$20.72***
(9.82)
(7.66)
(6.74)
Setback (00's ft) × Random
$1.41*
$1.15
$1.03
(0.85)
(0.73)
(0.79)
Setback (00's ft) × Engaged
$5.25*
$5.86**
$4.92*
(3.10)
(2.76)
(2.56)
Probability × Random
-$0.20***
-$0.23***
-$0.48***
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.12)
Probability × Engaged
-$0.08
-$0.05
-$0.96
(0.29)
(0.33)
(1.00)
Panel B: Total WTP
Farm
Random sample
-$23.90***
-$25.13***
-$17.11***
(3.51)
(3.57)
(5.00)
Engaged sample
-$35.13**
-$36.53**
-$1.43
(15.92)
(16.33)
(24.13)
Forest
Random sample
-$42.59***
-$52.50***
-$54.29***
(3.81)
(6.02)
(6.65)
Engaged sample
-$82.08***
-$104.22***
-$157.98***
(22.34)
(29.04)
(53.17)
Commercial
Random sample
$19.90***
$12.75***
$18.91***
(3.61)
(2.54)
(3.23)
Engaged sample
$73.88**
$40.80**
$196.30***
(29.98)
(17.63)
(75.03)
Brownfield
Random sample
$15.45***
$9.82***
$15.45***
(3.39)
(2.62)
(3.00)
Engaged sample
$38.04*
$18.50
$33.15*
(20.04)
(12.14)
(19.76)
Notes: Welfare estimates are in USD per household per month. Estimates in Panel A represent
marginal WTP values. In Panel B, the estimates represent total WTP values and assume a 10 acre,
fully visible installation with a setback of 150 feet, and a 0% probability of development in the
future. In both panels, standard errors are calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Appendix
This appendix provides supplemental figures and tables to our main results.
Figure A1 represents how important each attribute was for the respondents in the
random and engaged samples while making decisions. Land use is the most important
attribute for respondents in both samples. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is more important to engaged
respondents than random sample respondents. Respondents in the random sample are
slightly more affected by visibility than engaged respondents. The importance of
𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 is equally distributed between the two samples. Random sample respondents
care more about future probability of residential development than engaged
respondents, who find 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 to be the least important attribute. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the
second most important attribute for random sample respondents but for the engaged
respondents it is the second least important, a finding that plays out in the main results
as well.
Table A1 presents CL, HCL, and RPL coefficients obtained from estimating Equation
(8) on the sample of online respondents. Overall, the results from this subsample are
qualitatively similar to our main results. Both engaged and random sample
respondents like larger installations, as indicated by the positive coefficients on
𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑. Both sets of respondents also dislike
partly visible installations, though the coefficient is significant only for the random
sample in the RPL model. The coefficients on 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 are negative and significant (at the 1% level) across all
models, suggesting that fully visible installations are disliked by both groups of
respondents. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is significant (at the 10% level) only in the CL
model, but the coefficients on 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 are significant across all models,
suggesting that engaged respondents are more responsive to setback distance
compared to random sample respondents. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 is negative and
significant in all models at the 1% level, indicating that random sample respondents
are less likely to select the status-quo option as the future probability of residential
development increases. However, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 is insignificant
throughout, which implies that engaged respondents are unaffected by future
residential development on farms and forest lands. Similar to our main results,
respondents from both samples dislike having a higher electric bill (as indicated by the
negative and significant coefficients on 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑),
though the smaller magnitude associated with the engaged respondents indicates that
they are less affected by higher costs.
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Figure A1: Importance of attributes while making choices by sample groups
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Table A1: Attribute coefficients from logit regressions for online respondents
Random Parameters Logit
Conditional Heteroscedastic
Variable
Logit
logit
Mean
SD
Acres × Random
0.012***
0.021***
0.018***
0.045***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
Acres × Engaged
0.011
0.027***
0.027**
0.036***
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.013)
(0.011)
Part visibility × Random
-0.101
-0.113
-0.190**
0.209
(0.071)
(0.100)
(0.096)
(0.264)
Part visibility × Engaged
-0.294
-0.335
-0.368
0.601
(0.198)
(0.262)
(0.254)
(0.423)
Full visibility × Random
-0.332***
-0.432***
-0.547***
0.442
(0.079)
(0.110)
(0.124)
(0.291)
Full visibility × Engaged
-0.783***
-1.048***
-0.975***
0.057
(0.233)
(0.309)
(0.275)
(0.303)
Setback (00's ft) × Random
0.060*
0.076
0.067
0.350***
(0.036)
(0.049)
(0.051)
(0.107)
Setback (00's ft) × Engaged
0.151*
0.266**
0.232*
0.128
(0.089)
(0.127)
(0.132)
(0.109)
Probability × Random
-0.009***
-0.016***
-0.031***
0.079***
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.014)
Probability × Engaged
-0.002
-0.002
-0.045
0.197**
(0.008)
(0.015)
(0.046)
(0.087)
Cost × Random
-0.043***
-0.066***
-0.065***
(0.003)
(0.008)
(0.005)
Cost × Engaged
-0.029***
-0.045***
-0.047***
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.013)
Land use interactions
Farm × ASC × Random
0.893***
1.560***
0.849**
3.466***
(0.151)
(0.315)
(0.333)
(0.537)
Farm × ASC × Engaged
0.566
1.279**
-0.289
4.421
(0.420)
(0.649)
(1.083)
(2.913)
Forest × ASC × Random
1.690***
3.376***
3.268***
4.318***
(0.155)
(0.599)
(0.464)
(0.713)
Forest × ASC × Engaged
1.913***
4.350***
7.081***
8.391***
(0.471)
(1.069)
(2.433)
(3.252)
Brownfield × ASC × Random
-0.785***
-0.758***
-1.269***
0.034
(0.146)
(0.169)
(0.186)
(0.211)
Brownfield × ASC × Engaged
-1.534***
-1.218**
-1.916**
1.378
(0.565)
(0.599)
(0.835)
(1.489)
Commercial × ASC × Random
-0.975***
-0.953***
-1.495***
0.225
(0.151)
(0.200)
(0.193)
(0.273)
Commercial × ASC × Engaged
-2.562***
-2.230***
-9.596***
5.641***
(0.769)
(0.860)
(3.152)
(2.004)
Heteroskedastic variables
Farm
-0.460***
(0.139)
Forest
-0.806***
(0.166)
Commercial
0.017
(0.151)
Observations
9,933
9,933
9,933
AIC
6230.385
6184.403
5542.923
BIC
6374.458
6350.087
5816.661
Note: Acres refers to the size of the solar installation in acres. Part visibility and Full visibility are
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dummy variables = 1 if a solar installation is partially or completely visible, respectively. ASC is the
status-quo alternative-specific constant, or a dummy variable = 1 for the status-quo choice and 0
otherwise. Cost is in terms of USD per person per month. Cluster robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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